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Digital media has challenged copyright law in the past decades.  The ease with 
which digital files can be copied and disseminated has amplified copyright 
infringement and jeopardized the profitability of copyright-based industries around 
the globe. 
In this article I propose a solution:  to complement the copyright system with a 
Fair Trade Copyright system.  The Fair Trade Copyright system, which would 
apply optimally in the realm of the music industry, would encourage users to 
donate to recording artists on digital platforms and distribute the donations to 
artists. 
The implementation of my proposal will yield several improvements over the 
current system.  First, it would enlarge the pie of revenues that flow into the music 
industry.  Second, it would compensate recording artists, who are under-protected 
in the current regime, and augment their incentives to create.  Third, this model 
would monetize illegal music consumption, and would achieve this at a relatively 
low cost and without harming law-enforcement efforts.  Fourth, and finally, the 
model would potentially change the power balance within the music industry in 
favor of artists instead of intermediaries. 
 
              *  Engelberg Fellow, New York University School of Law.  This Article greatly benefited from 
comments and criticisms by Gideon Parchomovsky, Jane Ginsburg, Tim Wu, Polk Wagner, David 
Abrams, Bert Huang, June Besek, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Galia Rivlin, Eva Subotnik, Dave Morisson and 
Jessica Roberts, as well as participants of the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at 
Berkeley Law School, the Associates’ and Fellows’ Workshop at Columbia Law School, the participants 
of the Legal Scholarship seminar at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the students of the 
2010 Advanced Intellectual Property seminar at Columbia Law School.  All errors are the sole 
responsibility of the Author. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades in copyright history will probably be remembered as a 
period of constant struggles with new media.  Digital media has enabled users to 
copy and distribute digital content easily and inexpensively.1  As a result, 
unauthorized use of copyrighted works has amplified,2 leading to a sharp decline in 
music sales and jeopardizing the profitability of copyright-based industries around 
the world.3 
Copyright law comprises the natural avenue to address this challenge.  
Copyright law protects creators from various types of unauthorized use of their 
works.4  Lawmakers have thus sought solutions for the copyright predicament 
under the lamplight of copyright law.  Legislators have attempted to enhance 
enforcement of copyright law;5 and courts have imposed sanctions on direct and 
indirect copyright infringers.6 
In this Article, I advance an idea for a radically different solution, which can 
apply optimally in the realm of the music industry:  a Fair Trade Copyright system.  
This system would complement the extant copyright regime with a voluntary 
payment scheme from users to artists.  Practically, I propose that whenever users 
access music online, they would be provided with the option to make a donation to 
the artists who have performed the music.  I name this model “Fair Trade 
Copyright,” to connote a thematic association with the global fair trade movement.  
This movement encourages individuals to pay extra sums for goods they consume, 
 
 1. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:  Napster and the 
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 273 (2002) (“Not only has technology 
made it easier to copy music, but it has also dramatically reduced the costs of copying.”). 
 2. See infra Part IV. 
 3. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., RECORDING INDUSTRY IN NUMBERS 
2010 3 (2010); see also infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (detailing the exclusive rights copyright law provides). 
 5. For example, see the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 
2008, Pub. L. 110-403 (more commonly known as the PRO-IP Act), which hardened penalties for 
copyright infringement and appointed an IP Czar to oversee enforcement of the new measures.  
Recently, two bills that were introduced for this purpose generated an unprecedented public outcry and 
were eventually withdrawn:  the Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) (authorizing 
the government and intellectual property rights holders to compel Internet service providers to block 
access and payments to allegedly infringing websites), and the Protect IP Act, or The Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th 
Cong. (2011), which in section 3(b)(1) provides the government with the right to pursue actions 
particularly against offshore websites that are “dedicated to infringing activities.”  Thousands of Internet 
entities and bloggers blacked out their sites for twenty-four hours in protest of these bills, and as a result 
supporters of the legislation have withdrawn the legislation.  See Tamlin H. Bason, Reid Postpones 
Debate on Protect IP Act; Smith Follows Suit and Shelves SOPA, DAILY REP. FOR EXEC., Jan. 23, 2012, 
at A-4;  Eric Engleman, SOPA Petition Gets Millions of Signatures as Internet Piracy Legislation 
Protests Continue, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa-petition-gets-
millions-of-signatures-as-internet-piracy-legislation-protests-continue/2012/01/19/gIQAHaAyBQ_story. 
html (last updated Jan. 20, 2012); see also infra Part IV. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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in order to provide equitable income for the producers of these goods.7 
Complementing the copyright system with the proposed Fair Trade Copyright 
model would provide a significant improvement over the extant regime.  Currently, 
the lion’s share of sound recording copyrights vests with record labels, rather than 
with artists.8  Because revenues from creative works stem from copyright 
ownership, artists are in an economically inferior position.9  What is more, even if 
the copyright system were utterly successful, it would be unable to assure that 
artists derive any benefit from their works.  This legal reality may adversely affect 
creativity and reduce the incentive of music artists to create.10 
The Fair Trade Copyright model would address artists’ economic inferiority in 
the extant system, by generating a substantial new source of revenues and directing 
donations to artists themselves, regardless of the formal owner of the copyright in 
the recording, which is typically a record label.11 
An additional anticipated benefit of the Fair Trade Copyright model is that it 
would monetize not only legal, but also illegal music platforms.  The property 
nature of copyright means that illegal use of copyrighted works generally remains 
uncompensated (except via litigation).12  In contrast, I suggest that both legal and 
illegal services would participate in the Fair Trade Copyright scheme, and comprise 
a venue for users to donate to artists.  At the same time, because the Fair Trade 
Copyright model would not supplant the current system, copyright owners would 
still be able to take action against infringing activities of users and against illegal 
services. 
Overall, the Fair Trade Copyright model offers what other models previously 
put forth in this context have not:  a system that can both enlarge the pie of 
resources that flow into the music industry and distribute this pie more equitably 
among relevant stakeholders, without destroying the existing system. 
But how likely are users to pay music artists voluntarily?  It is undisputed that 
some social contexts induce voluntary payments, while others do not.  Based on the 
literature in this area, I attempt to design the Fair Trade Copyright model in a way 
that is most likely to yield significant contributions.  The model relies on the 
immense quantity of online music consumption, and would intensify existing 
norms and motivations that are known to promote voluntarism in equivalent 
situations.13 
 
 7. See ALEX NICHOLLS & CHARLOTTE OPAL, FAIR TRADE:  MARKET-DRIVEN ETHICAL 
CONSUMPTION 6 (2005); The Fairtrade Foundation, FAIRTRADE FOUND., http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/ 
what_is_fairtrade/fairtrade_foundation.aspx (last visited Aug. 4, 2011). 
 8. See infra Part I.A.  Note that a sound recording encompasses two copyrights.  The first is the 
sound recording copyright, which protects the recorded performance as embodied in the sound 
recording.  The second is the musical work copyright, which protects the underlying musical work from 
which the sound recording was created.  The discussion in this Article is focused exclusively on the 
sound recording copyright. 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. See infra Part I.C.  
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. See infra notes 125, 131 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
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The Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I analyzes artists’ inferiority in the 
music industry as it transitions into the digital age, and demonstrates the need for 
the Fair Trade Copyright model.  Part II delineates the mode of operation of the 
Fair Trade Copyright model and its potential effectiveness.  Part III considers and 
tackles potential challenges and objections to this model.  Part IV compares this 
scheme with three proffered alternative models for resolving the predicament in the 
music industry.  A short conclusion ensues. 
I.  THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT REGIME 
In this Part, I demonstrate the need for Fair Trade Copyright.  I begin by 
showing that artists receive little protection under copyright law, because they 
normally transfer away the copyrights in their works to record labels.  I then turn to 
show that digital music services cannot even potentially compensate artists in a 
significant manner.  Finally, I discuss the costs to society from under-compensation 
of artists. 
A.  UNDER-PROTECTION OF ARTISTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
Legal protection of creative works in the United States is bestowed almost 
exclusively upon copyright owners.  Copyright is a strong right.  It provides rights 
holders with a monopoly over a variety of activities, including, inter alia, copying 
of their works, distribution and public performance.14 
In contrast to the strong rights copyright law affords to copyright owners, the 
law provides hardly any protection for creators who transfer or otherwise disengage 
from their copyrights.  Specifically, copyright law contains few mandatory 
remuneration provisions for creators,15 and nothing in the law ensures that creators 
benefit in any way from works they have created if they do not hold the copyrights 
in those works.16 
While the law grants the initial copyright in a work to the creator of the work, it 
provides an easy mechanism to transfer rights to third parties.17  U.S. law further 
contains the unique “work made for hire” doctrine, which allows employers or 
commissioners of a work to own the copyright in works in the first place, in lieu of 
the work’s creator.18  Indeed, after a number of decades, authors may reclaim the 
 
 14. 17 U.S.C § 106 (2012).  The rights are subject to exceptions, such as the fair use doctrine.  Id. 
§ 107. 
 15. Such provisions include the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 
Stat. 4237 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010), as well as the Digital Performance Right in 
Sound Recordings Act (DPRA), Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, 111, 114, 115, 119, 801–803 (allocating a percentage of the royalty payments 
directly to performers).  See also infra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 16. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, 45 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 381, 383–84 (2009). 
 17. 17 U.S.C § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author 
or authors of the work.  The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.”); id. § 
204(a) (providing that transfer of exclusive rights must be in writing and signed by the grantor). 
 18. Id. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the 
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copyrights they have transferred.19  But the reclaim-mechanism is difficult to 
utilize,20 and does not apply at all to works made for hire.21 
Owing to this permissive framework, copyrights in sound recordings normally 
vest with record labels, rather than with artists.22  Recording contracts between 
artists and record labels typically define the sound recording as a work made for 
hire,23 in which case ownership of the work is conferred upon the record label from 
the very beginning.24  As a safeguard, the contracts usually include provisions that 
retroactively assign the works to the record label if a court finds post facto that the 
work made for hire doctrine is inapplicable.25  As a matter of fact, over eighty 
percent of the copyrights in sound recordings rest with one of three major record 
labels rather than with artists.26 
The alienability of copyrights was justified in light of particular historical 
circumstances:  until not long ago, artists were ill-positioned to perform the 
functions necessary to carry music to the public.27  Recording equipment was 
 
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in 
the copyright.”).  
 19. See id. § 203(a)(3) (providing that authors can reclaim copyrights thirty-five or forty years 
after they transferred them); id. § 304(c)(3) (stating that authors can terminate a copyright-grant during a 
period of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date the copyright was originally 
secured); id. § 304(d)(2) (permitting authors to terminate a copyright grant seventy-five years after the 
copyright was first secured if the 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) termination opportunity was foregone). 
 20. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2010) (arguing that 
recapturing copyrights is “sufficiently difficult to be largely illusory for most creators,” because, among 
other things, court decisions have narrowed the scope of the rights subject to recapture, and upheld 
assignee strategies to renegotiate the underlying contract before the termination date in order to avoid 
termination). 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (setting the case of works made for hire as an exception for the 
termination rights).  
 22. EMI, Sony BMG Music Entertainment (“Sony BMG”), Universal Music Group Recordings, 
Inc. (“UMG”) and Warner Music Group Corp. (“WMG”), “control over 80% of Digital Music sold to 
end purchasers in the United States.”  Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, No. 08-5637-cv, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 768 (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2010).  As of September 21, 2011, EMI was split in two and sold to 
UMG and to Sony.  The controversial merger was approved by Federal Trade Commission in September 
2012.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF BUREAU OF COMPETITION DIRECTOR RICHARD A. 
FEINSTEIN:  IN THE MATTER OF VIVENDI, S.A. AND EMI RECORDED MUSIC (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/comm/120921emifeinsteinstatement.pdf.  
 23. See generally Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire:  Hearing Before Subcomm. on 
Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
regstat52500.html (“Most contracts contain clauses specifying that the works . . . are works made for 
hire.  Such contracts generally contain an additional clause providing that if the work created is found by 
courts to fall within neither prong of the definition of works made for hire, that the performer assigns all 
his rights to the record company.”).  
 24. See supra note 19.  
 25. See supra note 24.  Courts have yet to resolve whether the work made for hire provisions in 
recording contracts are enforceable.  A negative answer to this question may lead to a wave of 
terminations of transfers by artists, starting in the year 2013, when recording artists’ termination rights 
begin to vest.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Mary LaFrance, Authorship and 
Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375 (2002). 
 26. See supra note 22.  
 27. There are at least three more reasons for the alienability of copyright.  One is the property 
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beyond the reach of individual artists,28 traditional media (like radio or TV) was 
required in order to connect artists to potential audiences,29 and dissemination of 
recorded music depended on tangible media.30  Free alienability of copyrights 
allowed the transfer of copyrights to the entities that were best positioned to exploit 
them and to fulfill the utilitarian goal of music copyright:  that music become 
available to the public.31  Artists, on their side, had few viable alternatives to record 
labels, and accordingly, signing a recording contract appeared to be a rational move 
for them. 
As a matter of fact, however, artists were entering unremunerative bargains with 
record labels.  Until this day, recording contracts are heavily skewed towards 
record labels’ interests.  In essence, besides granting record labels the copyrights in 
the artist’s work (or works),32 these contracts provide for disproportionate sharing 
of all revenues the works yield, while placing the full cost of production on the 
artists’ shoulders.33 
Specifically, recording contracts typically stipulate that in exchange for the 
copyrights, record labels pay artists a recoupable advance and invest other 
returnable or recoupable sums in the production of the album.34  The artist is 
entitled to fairly low royalties:  ten to twelve percent (for beginning artists) to 
seventeen to twenty-five percent (for top artists).35  The artist is not entitled to any 
 
nature of copyright, which is believed to inherently include alienation.  See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 
384 (explaining that our legal system “frowns on ‘restraints on alienation.’”).  Second, the alienability of 
copyright increases the economic value of the copyright, thus augmenting the author’s incentive to 
create.  The third reason is grounded in public choice theory and provides that record labels and other 
corporations have formed an interest group and managed to influence lawmakers to promote their 
interests at the expense of artists.  See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative 
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological 
Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).  See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 890 (1987) (arguing that lawmaking can be 
depicted as resulting from interest-group activity); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 880 (1975) (perceiving 
political settings as a “market” where legislation is effectively “sold” to the highest bidder by legislators, 
and “purchased” by interest groups.).  But see H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at 
Democracy:  Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2121, 2127 (1990) (stating that social choice theory does not fully describe “general legitimacy and 
meaningfulness of democratic decision making”). 
 28. Ku, supra note 1, at 306.  Today, various technologies make high quality audio production 
costs within the reach of everyone.  See, e.g., ABLETON, http://www.ableton.com (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012).  
 29. See, e.g., Courtney Love, Remarks at the Digital Hollywood Online Entertainment 
Conference (June 14, 2000), available at http://www.salon.com/2000/06/14/love_7/. 
 30. Ku, supra note 1, at 306. 
 31. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 32. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Ku, supra note 1, at 306 (“In fact, not only do musicians rarely earn royalties from the 
sale of CDs, they are often in debt to the recording industry for the costs of manufacturing, marketing, 
and distributing their music.”).  If the album fails to yield revenues, some debt is excused.  See infra 
notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 34. Sums are “recoupable” if they need to be paid out of the records’ proceeds and are forgiven in 
the absence of such proceeds, and are “returnable” if they need to be paid in any event.  
 35. JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC MONEY AND SUCCESS 114–15 (6th ed. 2008); see 
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royalties until she finished repaying in full the sums the record label invested in 
relation to the work, including any advances.36  As a matter of fact, most artists do 
not ever earn any royalties at all.37 
Worse yet, artists’ revenues are subject to various deductions (some of which 
are quite questionable),38 and to manipulations.39  The contracts further set limits 
on artists’ ability to supervise the accounting figures record labels present.40 
Recently, major record labels have embraced a new model of contracts, usually 
termed “360 degree contracts,” which entitle the label to a share of the artists’ 
revenues from sources beyond record sales (such as live performances and 
merchandise), in return for a larger advance.41  Notably, recording contracts bind 
 
also Music Law, BUCHE & ASSOCIATES, http://www.buchelaw.com/MUSIC.HTML (last visited Dec. 
27, 2012).  Note that significantly more artists are located in the lower half of the royalty range than in 
the upper.  Id.  For licensing of music, such as for movies or TV shows, artists are often entitled to a 
fifty percent share of royalties not subject to deduction.  This has led to manipulation of licensing deals 
by record labels, which classified licensing deals with third parties as sales, in order to avoid paying 
high royalties.  See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 36. DAVID BASKERVILLE, MUSIC BUSINESS HANDBOOK 157 (7th ed. 2000) (noting that recording 
contracts stipulate that the label does “not have to pay the artist any royalties . . . until the label has 
recovered, through a recoupment from the artist’s royalties, its out-of-pocket production costs and 
advances”).  Record labels conduct the accounting under these contracts.  See infra note 40. 
 37. See Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics:  The Economics of Popular Music 23 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11282, 2005) (“Indeed, only the very top bands 
are likely to receive any income other than the advance they receive from the company, because 
expenses – and there are many – are charged against the band’s advance before royalties are paid out.”); 
see also Phillip W. Hall Jr., Note, Smells Like Slavery:  Unconscionability in Recording Industry 
Contracts, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 189, 190 (2002) (noting that 99.6% of artists were believed 
to be indebted to the labels in 2002); David Segal, Aspiring Rock Stars Find Major-Label Deals—and 
Debts, WASH. POST, May 13, 1995, at A1, A7 (noting that many artists owe the label for advances 
before they will see any royalties).  Artists have complained about mistreatment by record labels.  See, 
e.g., PATRIK WIKSTRÖM, THE MUSIC INDUSTRY:  MUSIC IN THE CLOUD 30 (2009) (noting that “Prince 
performed several times with the word ‘slave’ written on his forehead as a way of describing his 
relationship with his employer”); Love, supra note 29 (discussing how musicians end up in debt to 
major record labels). 
 38. Twenty-five percent of royalties are regularly retained in a “reserve account”; the record 
company discounts up to 15% to cover the risk of breakage, up to 25% to cover the cost of packaging, 
and approximately 15% for records distributed for free, to cover the cost of encoding the song to digital 
format, encryption and digital delivery.  See BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 35, at 119–22; see also Ku, 
supra note 1, at 307.  
 39. See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 28 (2004) 
(discussing record labels’ “bookkeeping tricks”); see also Neil Strauss, Behind the Grammys, Revolt in 
the Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at D3 (“‘I]n 99.99 percent of the audits [of a record label’s 
accounting for an album], the labels are found to have underpaid the artist . . . .’”) (quoting Simon 
Renshaw, the manager of the band the Dixie Chicks).  
 40. See BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 35, at 122–23 (noting that recording contracts usually 
provide limits on the time an artist may object to the accounting figures, the time an audit can last, the 
scope of the audit, the identity of the auditor, and the physical location of the audit); see also Mike 
Masnik, Warner Music’s Royalty Statements:  Works of Fiction, TECHDIRT (Dec. 2, 2009, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091201/1957497156.shtml. 
 41. See Sara Karubian, 360 Deals:  An Industry Reaction to the Devaluation of Recorded Music, 
18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 395, 399 (2009); Jeff Leeds, The New Deal:  Band as Brand, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 11, 2007, at A1; Paul Resnikoff, 0 to 360 Degree—Different Types of Deals Emerge, MUSIC ROW 
L. (Jan., 23, 2009), http://musicrowlawyer.typepad.com/music_row_lawyer/2009/01/0-to-360-degrees-
different-types-of-deals-emerge.html.  Interestingly, embracing the 360 model by record labels had a 
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artists to long-term exclusivity provisions, practically rendering the signing of a 
record deal a decision for a lifetime career.42 
Ultimately, the extant system de facto grants strong rights almost exclusively to 
record labels, and provides little protection for artists.  As Jane Ginsburg observes, 
“all too often in fact, authors neither control nor derive substantial benefits from 
their work.”43 
B.  THE UNREDEEMED PROMISE OF DIGITAL MEDIA 
While the extant system provides little protection for artists, digital media 
brought a promise of change.44  Digital media has made several of the functions 
that were essential in order to disseminate music either unnecessary or more 
economically attainable.45  Digital media thus holds the potential to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with trade between artists and audiences, and can 
perhaps reduce the role of record labels as intermediates that are immune from 
competition.46 
In fact, however, while digital media opened new venues for artists to create 
and disseminate music independently, it failed to form equivalent ways for artists 
to monetize their music independently.47  In this Section, I demonstrate how both 
 
twofold effect.  On the one hand, it increased the hold of record labels over artists.  On the other hand, it 
allowed producers of live shows, such as LiveNation, to compete with record labels by offering a 360 
model as well. 
 42. “[T]he record company will always have a number of options to extend the recording 
agreement for additional periods and additional albums.”  BRABEC & BRABEC, supra note 35, at 113; see 
also Katherine L. McDaniel, Accounting for Taste:  An Analysis of Tax-and-Reward Alternative 
Compensation Schemes, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 235, 280 (2007) (noting that typical recording 
contracts grant the labels an option to extend the contract to six more albums at their sole discretion). 
 43. Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 382.  This observation pertains to authors in general, not only in 
the recording industry. 
 44. See supra Part I.A. 
 45. For example, burning the transporting cassettes or CDs has become unnecessary, and copying 
and distribution are achieved at lower costs.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New 
Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1646 (2001) (“Traditionally, publishers have 
performed or overseen the following functions:  selection; editing; reproducing the work in copies for 
distribution; distributing; marketing, including advertising and promotion; and accounting to the author 
for royalties.  Today, some of these functions are no longer required, and others can be 
disaggregated . . . .”). 
 46. It is possible to view record labels as a multisided platform.  One market side is artists, and 
the other market side is composed of audiences.  The status of record labels as a multisided platform 
might also erode as a result of reducing the transaction costs associated with connecting creators and 
consumers of music.  See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 
YALE J. ON REG. 325, 332–33 (2003) (arguing that platforms are needed when “[i]nformation and 
transaction costs as well as free-riding make it difficult in practice for members of distinct customer 
groups to internalize the externalities on their own”); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The 
Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 154 & 
n.7 (2007) (noting that multisided platforms often “aris[e] in situations in which there are externalities 
and in which transactions costs . . . prevent the two sides from solving this externality directly”). 
 47. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 388 (“[A]vailing oneself of the means of distribution is one 
thing, making a living from the works one distributes is another”); Brian Stelter, For Web TV, a Handful 
of Hits but No Formula for Success, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, at C1 (“[P]roducing Web content may 
be easy but profiting from it is hard.”).  See generally Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s 
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types of digital music services, i.e., streaming services and downloading services, 
are still geared towards enriching record labels rather than improving the economic 
state of artists.  This effect stems from the fact that these services rely on 
economies of scale:  every individual song, album or artist generates a negligible 
income, yet the aggregation of this income by record labels who own numerous 
copyrights can be substantial.  As a result, despite promising technologies, artists 
have remained largely bound to the compensation schemes they knew prior to the 
Internet revolution. 
1.  Streaming Services 
Streaming music services transmit music to users for listening in real time but 
not for downloading.48  In the terminology of copyright law, streaming services 
publicly perform the music,49 and do not distribute it.50 
Congress attached the performance right to sound recordings in the 1990s, and 
set forth particular rules for its implementation.51  Although the resulting 
framework is, as David Nimmer describes it, “frightfully complex,” we must delve 
into it in some detail, in order to understand the revenue potential streaming 
services offer artists.52 
Under the new regime, set forth in section 114 of the Copyright Act, two 
 
Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 98–199 (2002–03).  
 48. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Streaming . . . allows the real-time (or near real-time) playing of the song and does 
not result in the creation of a permanent audio file on the client computer.”). 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, 
either directly or by means of any device or process . . . .”).  A performance may be “to the public . . . 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the same place 
or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”  Id.; see also Cartoon Network LP v. 
CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]n determining whether a transmission is ‘to 
the public,’ it is of no moment that the potential recipients of the transmission are in different places, or 
that they may receive the transmission at different times.”); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.14[C][3], at 8-142 (2006) (“[I]f the same copy . . . of a given work is 
repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by different members of the public, albeit at different times, this 
constitutes a ‘public’ performance.”).  
 50. See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 443–44 (holding that 
streaming digital delivery is a public performance under § 106(3)).  However, it is not considered 
distribution under § 106(4).  
 51. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA), Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 
109 Stat. 336, 336 (1995) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, 111, 114, 115, 119, 801–803) 
(granting rights holders of sound recordings the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission”); Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
304, § 405 112 Stat. 2860, 2890–2902 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114(j)(13)).  The 
public performance right for sound recording is limited to the digital realm.  Proposals to expand the 
public performance right beyond this realm, particularly to traditional radio stations, are frequently on 
Congress’ agenda.  See, e.g., Performance Rights Act, S. 379, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009).  Note that 
while until the 1990s users did not need to ask permission or compensate rights holders for public 
performance of their records, a public performance license was still needed for the underlying musical 
piece, i.e., the lyrics and composition.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). 
 52. David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, Part I:  On the Absurd Complexity of the Digital Audio 
Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189, 191 (2000). 
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different licenses pertain to two types of streaming services.53  Interactive 
services—which stream to listeners a particular sound recording upon request—are 
subject to the regular copyright rule, under which they must obtain a license from 
copyright owners in order to use their works.54  The revenues these licenses yield 
are distributed to the artist pursuant to her share under the recording contract she 
has signed.55 
Noninteractive services, on the other hand, are eligible for a compulsory license 
for public performance of sound recordings.56  Section 114 further mandates a 
specific distribution scheme of the revenues the compulsory license yields, under 
which artists are entitled to forty-five percent of these revenues.57  Fifty percent of 
revenues are granted to the copyright owner of the sound recording (most likely, a 
record label), and five percent are shared between escrows of feature and non-
feature artists.58 
Rate-setting for the section 114 compulsory license is an intricate, never-ending 
saga.59  Concisely, the annual rates de facto serve as a ceiling, because digital 
services collectively negotiate a lower rate from copyright owners after the 
statutory rates are set.  The 2011 ceiling, for example, was set on 0.17 cent per 
performance,60 yet the negotiations set the maximum rent at 0.097 cents.61  As a 
result of these low figures, artists—who are entitled to forty-five percent of these 
sums—can only generate meager revenues from noninteractive streaming 
 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1).  On the distinction between interactive and noninteractive services see, 
for example, Arista Records, LLC. v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 54. BRIAN T. YEH, STATUTORY ROYALTY RATES FOR DIGITAL PERFORMANCE OF SOUND 
RECORDINGS:  DECISION OF THE COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD 2 (2008), available at http:// 
www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RL34020_081023.pdf. 
 55. 17 U.S.C § 114(g)(1). 
 56. To be eligible, services must restrict the number of songs that could be played per hour by a 
single artist or on a single album and avoid publishing an advance playlist of specific songs.  Id. § 
114(d)(2). 
 57. Id. § 114(g)(2)(A). 
 58. Id.  The Copyright Royalty Board has entrusted SoundExchange, a newly created Performing 
Rights Organization (PRO), to collect and distribute the statutory royalties under section 114.  See id. § 
801(b)(1) (2006) (listing four specific objectives in the calculation of royalty rates); SoundExchange, 
Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 59. Congress has delegated authority to set rates for the compulsory licenses under several 
statutory schemes.  The most recent, passed in 2005, directed the Librarian of Congress to appoint three 
Copyright Royalty Judges to set “reasonable rates and terms” for royalty payments from digital 
performances.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(f)(2)(B), 801, 803; 37 C.F.R. § 351 (2012); see also Intercollegiate 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748, 753–54 (D.C. Cir. 2009); NIMMER, supra note 
49, § 8.14[C][3]; YEH, supra note 54, at 4. 
 60. A $500 minimum applies.  37 C.F.R. § 380.3.  This payment includes fees for making an 
ephemeral recording under 17 U.S.C. § 112. 
 61. The market agreement sets differential rates for different types of services.  Under the new 
agreement, large services pay the greater of the per-song fee or 25% of their revenue.  Smaller services, 
defined as services which have $1.25 million or less in total revenue, would pay between 10% and 14% 
of their sales or 7% of their expenses, whichever is greater.  See Michael Schmitt, RAIN 7/7 News Flash:  
SoundExchange and “Pureplay” Webcasters Announce 2006–2015 Royalty Agreement, RAIN (July 7, 
2009), http://textpattern.kurthanson.com/articles/719/rain-77-soundexchange-and-pure-play-webcasters-
reach-royalty-agreement; see also Jim Puzzanghera, Company Town:  Music Websites Get a Break on 
Royalties, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2009, at B1. 
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services.62 
As to interactive services, although they operate under individual licenses, and 
thus yield overall higher sums than compulsory licenses, artists are not likely to 
enjoy this premium.63  First, record labels structure the agreements with digital 
services in a way that allows them to pay minimal royalties, such as by 
manipulating the definitions of “sale” or “license” to fit to the lower royalty 
provision under artists’ recording contracts.64  Second, record labels often demand 
services to pay part of the proceeds in the form of advances or equity stake in the 
service, and thus avoid sharing them with artists.65  Third, artists’ royalties are 
likely to fall prey to deductions and to be swallowed by the artists’ debt to the 
record label.66  Even artists who are not signed with record labels receive low sums 
via interactive services.  Specifically, interactive services yield for them merely 
between 0.0005 cents to one cent per stream.67 
Although these sums are fairly low, the above analysis should not be read as a 
general critique of the streaming business model.  These services may have a range 
of advantages.68  A comprehensive analysis of these services is beyond the confines 
of this Article.  Yet, this analysis shows that the streaming business model can 
benefit primarily record labels, which directly negotiate licensing deals, and 
 
 62. A service that operates under the section 114 compulsory license would generate at most less 
than 0.05 cents ($0.0005) per stream for performers (45% of 0.097¢).  This means that a record has to be 
streamed more than two thousand times in order to result in one dollar in revenues for the artist.  The 
same number of streams will result in approximately two dollars for unsigned, independent artists who 
are also the copyright owners of their music.  Even independent artists must receive their digital 
royalties from SoundExchange, the representative body nominated by the Copyright Office to collect 
performance royalties for sound recordings, and are subject to its administrative fee and procedures.  See 
SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/. 
 63. See supra note 54.  
 64. Such manipulations affect licensing deals with both streaming services and downloading 
services.  See, e.g., FBT Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010); Ridenhour v. 
UMG Recordings, No. 4:11-cv-05321-DMR (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011); James v. UMG Recordings, No. 
3:11-cv-01613-SI (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011); “The Youngbloods” v. BMG Music, No 07 Civ. 2394 
(GBD) (KNF), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1585 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2011); see also Ben Sisario, Eminem 
Lawsuit May Raise Pay for Older Artists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at B1; Neil Strauss, Record 
Labels’ Answer to Napster Still Has Artists Feeling Bypassed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at A1. 
 65. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeff Leeds, Music Companies Grab a Share of the YouTube Sale, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, at C1 (reporting that record labels negotiated $50 million in equity stakes in 
YouTube as part of the licensing agreement); Mark Cuban, Some Intimate Details on the Google 
YouTube Deal, BLOG MAVERICK (Oct. 30, 2006, 5:35 AM), http://blogmaverick.com/2006/10/30/some-
intimate-details-on-the-google-youtube-deal; see also Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARD. 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 64 (2012) (“As some cynical observers noted at the time, structuring the licensing 
deal as an equity stake enabled the labels to shelter the proceeds from obligations to pay royalties to 
artists and composers.”). 
 66. See supra note 38.  
 67. Some streaming services appear to generate for artists just under one cent per stream, while 
others generate 0.015 cents or 0.077601 cents per stream.  Faza, The Paradise That Should Have Been, 
CYNICAL MUSICIAN (Jan. 21, 2010), http://thecynicalmusician.com/2010/01/the-paradise-that-should-
have-been/; Benji Rogers, Thank You for My $0.00077601.  No Really Thank You, PLEDGEMUSIC (May 
24, 2010, 4:01 PM), http://www.pledgemusic.com/articles/25-thank-you-for-my-0-00077601-no-really-
thank-you?locale=es. 
 68. For example, these services can be effective as promotion tools and enhance users’ access to 
music. 
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aggregate the small payments accumulated from the musical creations of many 
artists.69 
2.  Downloading Services 
Downloading services, typically online music stores, allow users to download 
music on a one-track basis.70  In copyright law terminology, downloading services 
reproduce and distribute music but do not evoke the public performance right.71  
Because section 114 is limited to the public performance right, downloading 
services operate under a regular, individual license from copyright owners, and are 
not subject to any regulatory distribution scheme.72 
Downloading services offer a somewhat better deal to artists than do streaming 
services.  This is not utterly surprising.  Streaming services typically provide users 
with a wide selection of music in return for either advertisements or a low monthly 
fee.73  Downloading services, on the other hand, charge a per-track or per-album 
price, and simply have a larger pot to share for each track. 
In terms of revenues, artists who are signed with record labels earn nine cents on 
 
 69. Theoretically this system might also benefit top artists whose music is streamed millions of 
times.  However, the data does not always support this conclusion.  The singer Lady Gaga claimed to 
have received merely $167 for a million streams from the streaming service Spotify.  Spotify denied the 
claim.  See Report:  Spotify Paid Lady Gaga $167 For 1M Plays, HYPEBOT.COM (Nov. 23, 2009), 
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2009/11/report-spotify-paid-lady-gaga-167-for-1m-plays.html. 
 70. Record labels have historically been centered on sales of bundled albums, despite sometimes 
releasing “singles,” i.e., discs typically containing the most commercially viable song of a new album.  
In contrast, digital stores now enable customers to choose from the full range of songs on most albums.  
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1015, 1030 (2008); Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll:  What Jambands Can 
Teach Us About Persuading People To Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 657 (2006) 
(“No longer can the music industry rely on one-hit-wonders to sell relatively high-priced pieces of 
plastic or vinyl containing one or two hits bundled with less desirable songs.”); see also infra note 224 
and accompanying text. 
 71. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 
443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citations omitted) (“Although we acknowledge that the term “perform” should 
be broadly construed . . . we can conceive of no construction that extends it to the copying of a digital 
file from one computer to another in the absence of any perceptible rendition.  Rather, the downloading 
of a music file is more accurately characterized as a method of reproducing that file.”); see also 
Maverick Recording Co. v. Goldshteyn, No. CV-05-4523, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52422, at *8 
(E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2006) (“Downloading and uploading copyrighted files from a peer-to-peer network 
constitutes, respectively, reproducing and distributing copyrighted material in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 
106.”). 
 72. See supra note 51. 
 73. The distinction between ad-based and fee-based services is somewhat blurred, because ad-
based services typically utilize the free service to lure users to upgrade to an ad-free, fee-based model.  
See, e.g., Kim-Mai Kutler, Spotify CEO Daniel Ek Vague on U.S. Launch, Company Has 320,000 Paid 
Subscribers, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 16, 2010), http://venturebeat.com/2010/03/16/spotify-daniel-ek/ 
(quoting Spotify’s CEO:  “We want to make sure there’s a conversion rate [from free to paid 
subscription] . . . because that’s the only way we’ll be self-sustainable.”).  Some free services began to 
collect subscription fees for some services or geographic areas, or limited the free option.  See Important 
Update on Royalties, PANDORA (July 7, 2009), http://blog.pandora.com/pandora/archives/2009/07/ 
important_updat_1.html; Last.fm to Charge for Streaming, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7963812.stm. 
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average from the sale of each track on iTunes or Amazon (the label’s share is fifty 
three cents).74  Unsigned artists are required to use an intermediary service to 
access online stores.  After the fee such intermediaries charge, artists can retain 
63.7 cents per track.75 
These sums exclusively are nevertheless too low to sustain a living.  A solo 
artist who is signed with a record label would need to have her music downloaded 
more than twelve thousand times per month in order to obtain even the minimum 
wage.76  If the artist is not signed with a label, she can approach the minimum wage 
if her music was downloaded more than fifteen hundred times.77  For band 
members to reach these sums, this figure would need to be multiplied by the 
number of band members. 
Clearly, my calculations did not take into account diversification of revenue 
sources.  Combined platforms of revenues can certainly increase the overall sums 
artists earn.  Yet, these calculations do indeed demonstrate the low capability of 
existing business models to improve the economic prospect of artists. 
C.  THE RESULT:  ARTISTS’ ECONOMIC INFERIORITY AND ITS COSTS 
Given the reality depicted above, artists today face a choice between two 
unremunerative career alternatives.  The first is to sign a contract with a record 
label.  This option provides temporary economic security in the form of large 
advances and investments, which allow artists to devote their time to creating 
music.  The tradeoff is that artists must sign an unfavorable record deal and often 
remain economically and professionally dependent on the record label for the rest 
of their careers.78  The second option is to forgo a recording contract and create and 
disseminate music independently with the help of digital media.  Here, the tradeoff 
is not only that artists must bear the cost of production of the records, but also that 
they cannot realistically expect reasonable compensation for their work, because of 
the payment structure of digital music services, as described in Part I.B.79  Neither 
way allows most artists to earn a living from creating art. 
The implausibility that music creativity can provide sufficient living for artists 
generates at least four types of costs.  First and foremost, the low returns artists can 
expect ex post may have a negative impact on their incentives to create ex ante.  
This is a critical point.  American copyright law is designed to encourage creativity 
 
 74. How Much Do Music Artists Earn Online?, INFO. IS BEAUTIFUL (Apr. 13, 2010), 
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/2010/how-much-do-music-artists-earn-online/?utm_source=log. 
bybjorn.com&utm_medium=twitter. 
 75. For example, services such as TuneCore (http://www.tunecore.com/) and CD Baby 
(http://www.cdbaby.com/) intermediate between artists and digital storefronts like iTunes in return for a 
fee.  See Faza, supra note 67; Rogers, supra note 67. 
 76. See How Much Do Music Artists Earn Online?, supra note 74. 
 77. Note, however, that unsigned artists incur the costs of payment for services such as 
distribution, promotion, etc. 
 78. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 79. Artists who are signed with labels indirectly bear the cost of production as well, because the 
sums record labels invest in the production are returnable or recoupable.  See supra note 34 and 
accompanying text.  Yet, they do not need to devote the time and effort to this activity. 
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for the benefit of society.80  As Shyamkrishna Balganesh explains:  “By providing a 
creator with limited exclusionary control over creative expression at time T2, the 
system is thought to encourage the production of such expression at time T1.”81  
Yet, as the preceding discussion shows, the extant framework misses the mark:  
while the system provides economic incentives for record labels to execute their 
part of the creative process, it generates little incentives for individual artists to 
create.  Relatedly, undercompensation may raise moral concerns, because artists are 
unable to reap what they have sowed.82 
One may argue that generating economic incentives for record labels rather than 
for artists in the context of music creation might be efficient for two reasons.  First, 
artists might derive indirect pecuniary benefit from record sales, such as from 
performances, and this benefit can generate a sufficient incentive to create.83  As 
William Landes and Richard Posner note, “[m]any authors derive substantial 
benefits from publication that are over and beyond any royalties.”84  However, the 
shift to “360 degree contracts” considerably blunts the force of this argument by 
biting into artists’ revenues from performances and other sources.85  Moreover, as I 
discuss below, relying on indirect pecuniary benefit may create an incentive for 
artists to only perform music that they have created in the past, and not to create 
new music.86 
 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (“The 
grant of exclusive rights is intended to encourage the creativity of ‘Authors and Inventors.’”); Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that it is the best way to advance public welfare through 
the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1047 (2008) 
(“Because the initial production of intellectual goods often necessitates considerable investment and 
once produced they can be copied at a very low cost, there is a serious risk that not enough intellectual 
goods would be created without legal protection.”); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:  The New 
Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 471 (1998) (“By guaranteeing 
authors certain exclusive rights in their creative products, copyright seeks to furnish authors and 
publishers, respectively, with incentives to invest the effort necessary to create works and distribute 
them to the public.”); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
285 (1996) (“To encourage authors to create and disseminate original expression, copyright law accords 
them a bundle of proprietary rights in their works.”).  
 81. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 
1577 (2009). 
 82. Admittedly, it is unclear that American copyright law leaves room for moral considerations if 
they do not affect actors’ incentives.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“Intellectual property rights are an exception . . . and 
they are granted only when—and only to the extent that—they are necessary to encourage invention.”).  
It is worth noting, however, that even if copyright is reduced to a pure utilitarian system, unjust systems 
may eventually have an effect on incentives, because people naturally avoid situations where they feel 
they are treated unfairly. 
 83. See infra Part IV.C. 
 84. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 325, 331 (1989). 
 85. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 86. See infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text. 
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Second, one may also argue that while economic incentives are necessary to 
motivate record labels’ investments,87 they are not needed in order to spur artists’ 
creativity, because individual artists are mainly driven by intrinsic motivations.88  
Yet, this rationale can only go so far:  if artists cannot earn a living from their 
music, they will need to maintain a day job in order to put bread on their tables, and 
devote less time to music creativity.89 
The second cost of the current structure lies in the considerable barriers to entry 
it creates for new artists.  The overwhelming holdings of copyrights by record 
labels (horizontal integration),90 together with the integration of the entire process 
of music production and distribution into the record labels (vertical integration),91 
have placed record labels in a controlling position over the majority of the means 
and resources necessary to create music professionally.  This status created barriers 
to entry, because artists who were unable to secure a recording contract could not 
effectively create and disseminate music.92  Indeed, the status of record labels as 
gatekeepers has eroded in the digital age.  There are now alternative ways to 
produce and disseminate music.  Yet, without ways for artists to monetize their 
music independently, the status quo holds, because record labels still provide the 
main road for artists who seek funding to support music creativity. 
Another, corollary cost concerns the negative impact the gatekeeping function of 
record labels has on the variety and diversity of music.  The extant system, where 
artists have few opportunities to earn money without the involvement of record 
labels, may subjugate the availability of music to the labels’ business interests.  As 
analyzed above, record labels’ profits stem from economies of scale.  They thus 
have an incentive to produce music that fits the mainstream taste and yields 
maximum profits.  Record labels’ dominance risks compelling artists to follow 
 
 87. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 84, at 326–27 (arguing that copyright is designed to 
assure adequate incentives for both artists and intermediaries); Ku, supra note 1, at 266–67 (“Who 
would invest the money necessary to press thousands of albums of a new recording artist . . . unless 
there was the potential to recoup that initial investment and then some?”). 
 88. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1151 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire:  Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 513, 517–18 (2009) (expressing skepticism that monetary incentives lead authors to 
create); Diane L. Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives:  Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011) (drawing on social science studies to explore internal motivations to create). 
 89. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership:  Reconsidering Incentives in 
a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1121, 1137 (2003) (“Having made the point that artistic production is 
not only, and perhaps not even primarily, about money, it is nevertheless unlikely that writers will 
devote themselves as fully to authorship as a profession if they cannot profit from the value that others 
place on their work.”).  
 90. See supra note 22. 
 91. David Blackburn, On-Line Piracy and Recorded Music Sales 6 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ 
summary?doi=10.1.1.117.2922 (“Albums are typically produced in the following manner. First, an 
artist . . . is signed to multi-year contract . . . .  An album is then produced in one of the label’s recording 
studios, printed onto a compact disc by the production arm of the owner recorded company, and 
distributed by the distribution arm of the company.  Thus . . . the path from artist to consumer is 
essentially completely vertically integrated.”). 
 92. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.  The bundled service offerings of record labels 
can also create barriers to entry for potential rivals who could compete with the existing record labels. 
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record labels’ instructions and harm their own creative instinct and society’s 
interest in diverse music, for the sake of pursuing economies of scale. 
An additional concern is “misallocation costs,” namely, misallocation of market 
resources in favor of record labels, which offer little benefit to society.  In free 
markets, the law should not concern itself with market bargaining and the way in 
which gains from trade are divided.93  However, as the above analysis shows, there 
are few reasons to assume free market in the recording industry.  The industry is 
loaded with inefficiencies and market failures, such as market concentration, 
unequal bargaining power between artists and labels and the absence of markets for 
artists to sell their works.94 
As the preceding discussion implies, the value of record labels to society has 
probably decreased:  many of the traditional functions of record labels can now be 
relinquished, disaggregated or undertaken by other entities.95  Moreover, digital 
media can perform many of the functions record labels perform at a lower cost.96  
Yet, the extant system still allocates the lion’s share of music revenues to record 
labels.  Given that these resources could have been channeled to support artists’ 
creativity, this misallocation of resources considerably diminishes societal 
welfare.97 
Misallocation of resources leads to only more misallocation of resources 
because the lucrativeness of the misallocation results in excessive involvement of 
record labels in the creative process.  This negative dynamic effect maintains the 
economic gap between artists and record labels.  It thus preserves the economic 
dependency of artists on record labels and exacerbates all of the costs that I 
discussed in this Section. 
II.  THE FAIR TRADE COPYRIGHT MODEL 
In this Part, I present and advance the Fair Trade Copyright model.  I begin by 
exploring practical aspects of the model.  My aim is to demonstrate how the Fair 
Trade Copyright model might actually operate, and to delineate the most efficient 
 
 93. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:  The 
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 451 (1995).  However, in the recording industry 
there are few reasons to assume efficient free market for this purpose.  Structural unequal bargaining 
power between artists and record labels, market concentration, and the lack of meaningful alternatives 
for artists, together with public choice problems may dictate the distribution of revenues.  See supra note 
27. 
 94. All these are combined with serious public choice problems.  See supra note 27. 
 95. This process characterizes content industries across the board.  See Ginsburg, supra note 45, 
at 1646; see also Ku, supra note 1, at 294 (“[U]ntil now the bundling of interests was acceptable because 
the cost of producing the vessels—CDs, books and DVDs—for content, and distributing those vessels, 
was an essential component of making content available to the public.”). 
 96. I do not want to suggest that the role of record labels has become redundant.  In fact, this 
Article is completely agnostic as to the contemporary role of record labels.  But, as I explain, 
incentivizing record label to orchestrate the venture of music creation cannot be deemed sufficient to 
sustain musical creativity. 
 97. In the hands of record labels, these resources may sometimes even be used for socially 
inefficient uses, such as litigation and lobbying that have the effect of increasing misallocation costs.  
See also infra Part IV.A. 
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way for the model to achieve its goals.  Then, I address the benefits of the model,  
showing that the Fair Trade Copyright model would be welfare enhancing on two 
levels.  First, it would create an independent revenue stream for artists, thus 
augmenting artists’ incentives to create and addressing the problems discussed in 
Part I.  Second, Fair Trade Copyright can promote long-term efficiency by shifting 
the power balance within the music industry in favor of artists. 
A.  THE FAIR TRADE COPYRIGHT MECHANISM 
In the reality which I envision, users would be presented with an option to make 
a donation to performing artists any time they listen to music or download it.  
Practically, I suggest that a designated button would appear on users’ screens 
whenever they play or download music to their computers or digital devices.  
Pressing that button would allow users to select the amount they wish to donate and 
a payment method, and transfer their contribution to the artist.98 
In the following discussion, I explore the steps necessary for implementation of 
the Fair Trade Copyright proposal and how best to perform each step.  Two 
principles guide this analysis:  simplicity and low cost.  The Fair Trade Copyright 
system must be easy and inexpensive for services to implement, for users to utilize 
and for musicians to collect from.  Otherwise, it would involve considerable 
opportunity costs for all parties involved and would be underused.99 
1.  Creating an Opt-Out System for Artists 
The first step to implementing the model is to enroll artists in the Fair Trade 
Copyright system.  One option to accomplish this is to create an opt-in system, 
where musicians would need to elect to participate in the system in order to collect 
donations.  However, an opt-in system would face the risk of suboptimal artist 
participation.  The reason for this is twofold.  First, people generally lean towards 
“inertia,” and tend to follow the path of least resistance.100  Second, each individual 
artist would not internalize the full social value of the system, because this value 
includes long term implications on prospective artists and the public at large.101 
The better option is to create an opt-out system, where donations will be 
 
 98. Payment methods are abundant these days, and include Internet payment services (e.g., 
PayPal, moneybookers), credit cards or, in case of mobile-phones, cellular carriers.  
 99. See Fred D. Davis, Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Ease of Use, and User Acceptance of 
Information Technology, 13 MIS Q. 319, 320 (1989) (noting that perceived ease of use of a technology 
determines to a large extent the probability that it will actually be used); see also Richard P. Bagozzi, 
The Legacy of the Technology Acceptance Model and a Proposal for a Paradigm Shift, 8 J. ASS’N FOR 
INFO. SYS. 244 (2007); Mohammad Chuttur, Overview of the Technology Acceptance Model:  Origins, 
Developments and Future Directions (2009) (unpublished review paper), available at http:// 
sprouts.aisnet.org/9-37. 
 100. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 179, 203 (2009) (noting that “inertia” is a central reason behind traditionally low opt-out 
rates from class actions (as well as low opt-in rates) because people “usually do nothing”). 
 101. See infra Part II.B.  This risk is inherent to collective actions, where part of the social value 
from the collective action is located in the impact of the action beyond each member.  
(2) HELMAN_POST-FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2013  12:19 PM 
174 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [36:2 
collected for all artists, unless the artist actively elects to eschew the system.  An 
opt-out system would yield a higher membership rate not only because of the 
power of “inertia,” but also because a rational artist will not opt-out of a system 
from which she can only gain.  A higher membership rate would, in turn, augment 
the system’s effectiveness:  First, users and services would be more inclined to 
cooperate with it, and more artists will have an incentive to promulgate the model 
and encourage users to participate in it.  Second, wide participation of artists will 
increase the likelihood that the industry-altering potential of the system will be 
fulfilled.102 
Obviously, as far as procedure is concerned, artists would still need to actively 
provide information to the system in order to receive the funds donated to them.  
This, however, does not upset the opt-out status of the system.  Donations will be 
collected even for artists who have not provided information, and would be retained 
in reserve until the artist registers, unless the artist opts-out of the system.103 
2.  Creating a PRO and Setting up a Collection System 
The next challenge pertaining to the model is to set up a safe and efficient way 
to transfer users’ donations to the designated artists.  At first blush, the simplest 
way to accomplish this is to assign each music service the task of transferring to 
artists the donations users make to them via the platform of that service. 
While this process appears simple and instantaneous at first sight, it should be 
rejected.  First, it would be unrealistic to expect artists to provide data to all the 
different services, and websites have no incentive (and perhaps no way) to collect 
the data themselves.  As a result, while services can know when an artist should be 
paid,  they would have no way to actually transfer the donation to that artist.104  But 
even if services could obtain this information, it would be inefficient and cost-
intensive if each music service would need to manage and transfer numerous 
micropayments to different artists.  Nor should music services bear the 
administrative cost and risk associated with the payment process.  This would 
impose unnecessary costs on services and discourage the cooperation of services 
with the system. 
What is more, management of the donations by services would raise reliability 
 
 102. See infra Part II.B. 
 103. In a similar manner, SoundExchange retains the money for artists until they claim it.  See 
supra note 62.  Another possibility is that the Fair Trade Copyright system would send money of artists 
who neither register nor opted out to their account in SoundExchange or to their record label.  I believe 
this path would be less preferable because these organizations take a cut of the revenues, but this would 
still be better than the alternative—i.e., that these artists will not be part of the system at all. 
 104. Music services are already obligated to collect and provide data that links music tracks to 
their performers to copyright owners and other entities, such as SoundExchange.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
114(g)(2), (d)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (requiring digital broadcasts to include, “if technically feasible,” the 
information encoded in the sound recording that identifies the title of the recording and the featured 
recording artist). 
The problem of transferring the donation to the artist would be ameliorated in the context of services 
where both artists and users need to be signed-in, such as eBay, Amazon and other platforms.  Most 
services, however, do not require registration by performing artists themselves. 
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and data-security issues, because services would need to be trusted to transfer the 
entire amounts to the correct artists and securely maintain users’ information.105  
This problem may discourage users from using the model.  The problem may be 
prohibitive in the context of illegal music sites, which may be open source-based 
and generally less reliable for this purpose.106 
To overcome these problems, I suggest establishing a collective organization for 
performing artists.  I model this organization after Performing Rights Organizations 
(PROs), which administer digital performance royalties to songwriters, composers 
and publishers.107  Services would route users’ donations to the PRO rather than 
directly to artists, and the PRO would distribute the donations to artists 
periodically.  This mechanism closely resembles the current operation of PROs 
around the world. 
A PRO would provide the most efficient solution to the challenges discussed in 
this Section.  First, the PRO is better positioned to obtain necessary information 
from artists.  Artists will only need to provide their information once and to a 
reliable body.  Furthermore, the PRO will be able to hold the money for artists in 
reserve until the artist claims it, a capacity that most services are not likely to have. 
Second, the PRO would spare services the costs associated with obtaining 
information and managing the payment process, thus enhancing services’ 
incentives to participate in the system.  Indeed, the services would need to inform 
the PRO regarding the target artist for each donation.  But services prepare similar 
reports for other purposes in any case, and the marginal cost of providing the 
reports to the PRO is negligible.108  The experience with member-run PROs shows 
that this framework enables relatively low operating costs and a high distribution 
rate.109 
A PRO would also substantially alleviate reliability concerns.  First, the fact that 
donations will always be sent to the same address and not dispersed among various 
 
 105. Clearly payments would be processed by external payment services, which have strong 
incentives and established practices to provide secure payment services.  Yet, the platform has to be 
trusted not to interfere with the payment service’s operation and not to access or store users’ data.  
Moreover, some services, such as iTunes and Amazon, do have their own payment system. 
 106. See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break:  On the Secondary Liability of 
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 150–51 (2010) 
(noting that illegal file sharing sites are often short-lived and sometimes reside overseas).  Open-source 
services exacerbate the problem because programmers can change the service-code to divert donations 
elsewhere. 
 107. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, 
Inc. (BMI) and SESAC (originally, the Society of European Stage Authors & Composers) are the three 
PROs operating in the United States.  SoundExchange operates as a PRO for the sake of collection of 
section 114 revenues.  See supra note 62. 
 108. See supra note 104.  Illegal services are unlikely to provide such reports, because, inter alia, it 
might increase their risk of being prosecuted.  The solution for the lack or data may be to distribute the 
proceeds from illegal services pro rata, according to the consumption patterns on legal sites.  A similar 
solution is employed by other PROs, such as ASCAP, when they collect proceeds from bars and 
restaurants, because verifying the playlist of each individual establishment is costly. 
 109. For a comparison, ASCAP, a member-run PRO, has about 12% as a distribution rate, 
meaning that 88% of the money it collects is distributed to its members.  See The ASCAP Advantage, 
ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ascapadvantage.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
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artists would enable the PRO to compare between different services and locate 
irregularities.  Thus, if a report by one service is substantially different from the 
others, the PRO may conduct a closer inspection of that service.  The PRO could 
also serve as a focal point for complaints by users or artists who suspect the 
reliability of a particular service.  A central mechanism to address the problem of 
reliability and trust will be discussed in the next Subsection. 
3.  Creating a Fair Trade Copyright Trademark 
A major challenge for the Fair Trade Copyright application is to create an 
incentive for services to implement the system and—once implemented—to 
participate in it in a trustworthy manner. 
To address these challenges, I suggest what is perhaps the “hardest” mechanism 
in the otherwise “soft law” nature of the Fair Trade Copyright proposal.  I propose 
that the Fair Trade Copyright button to be installed on services’ platforms embed a 
trademark that the PRO will register with the Patent and Trademark Office.  The 
mark would be the exclusive property of the Fair Trade Copyright PRO and will be 
used for a threefold function.  First, the mark would be used for ethical branding of 
services that use the service appropriately.  Second, the mark would augment the 
system’s reliability by allowing the PRO to supervise and create standards for 
services that use the system.  Third, the mark would signal to users which services 
are reliable for donations.110 
To begin with the branding function of the mark, ethical branding would 
produce an economic incentive for services to join the system.111  It is well 
established in the literature on corporate charity that “[s]ome customers prefer, all 
things being equal, to trade with an organization that has a social mission rather 
than with a more conventional profit-maximizing corporation.”112  Similarly, the 
ethical-branding certificate would be a draw for users and thereby allow 
participating services to gain a competitive advantage over nonparticipating 
services, at no cost.113 
 
 110. A similar practice is employed by the Fairtrade Foundation.  The Foundation owns the 
Fairtrade mark and licenses the right to use the mark only to entities that meet international Fairtrade 
standards.  Use of the Fairtrade Mark, FAIRTRADE FOUND., http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/ 
business_services/use_of_the_fairtrade_mark.aspx (last visited July 20, 2011). 
 111. Competitive advantage in the form of ethical branding would pertain to legal and illegal 
services alike.  As for illegal services, while the Fair Trade Copyright cannot immunize them from 
copyright infringement claims, it may make them appear more morally sound (perhaps “the Robin Hood 
of the music industry”) and increase their appeal with users.  Legal services, for their part, would need to 
compete with illegal services on the ethical front as well, and would not wish to appear as if they are 
siding with record labels against both users (by asking money for what illegal services offer for free) and 
artists (by shirking from installing the Fair Trade Copyright option). 
 112. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1374 (2011); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 437 (2002) (suggesting that “charitable giving is simply another 
form of advertising”); Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 945, 982 (2011) 
(“After all, doing good for others can be a strategic public relations ploy, designed to improve consumer 
perception of the firm’s brand and increase future revenues.”). 
 113. Recall that these services are relying on economies of scale, and their revenues depend on the 
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Digital music services today compete in a non-price-based competition in order 
to draw traffic to their sites.  Price competition in digital music is most likely 
exhausted at this point.114  The Fair Trade Copyright branding would provide much 
needed competitive edge.  Rational services are thus likely to install the Fair Trade 
Copyright feature because of individual cost-effectiveness assessments:  the system 
provides a competitive advantage at virtually zero cost.115 
If the incentives analyzed above prove insufficient to induce services to install 
the Fair Trade Copyright, the PRO might consider, as a second best solution, 
allowing services to keep a share of the overall donations.116  Indeed, this result 
would reduce artists’ share in the Fair Trade Copyright revenues.  But the 
alternative—under-participation in the model—would result in greater under-
compensation of artists and would thus come at a much greater cost to society.117  
The advantage of this second best solution would be to create incentives for 
services not only to install but also to promulgate the Fair Trade Copyright concept, 
and it would still be a significant improvement over the current system. 
Consider now how the fair trade trademark would enhance the reliability of the 
system.  In order for a service to claim a fair trade copyright status, the service will 
need to license the mark from the PRO.  The license would set guidelines for the 
eligibility of services to utilize it and for the actual use of the mark.  These 
guidelines would be designed to ensure that the full amount of contributions is 
being transferred and that users’ information is securely stored.  The guidelines 
would likely include, inter alia, using secure payment services,118 providing 
accurate information regarding users’ payments, and allowing the PRO to supervise 
the payments.119  The PRO will further retain the right to supervise the use of the 
 
size of their user-base.  See supra Part I.B. 
 114. Streaming services are typically free-of-charge or are very low-priced.  See supra note 73.  In 
addition, illegal services, which offer music for free, pushed all prices down towards zero.  See infra 
note 128 and accompanying text. 
 115. An exception to this cost-benefit analysis might be services that enjoy market dominance and 
beneficial license agreements with record labels under the current scheme, such as Apple’s iTunes.  
Such services may be less susceptible to competitive challenges.  Yet, if the Fair Trade Copyright 
becomes standard across all other services, objection to it from any service would likely be reduced.  
 116. Some music services may have altruistic motivations as well, especially in light of the fact 
that quite a few music services were created by musicians or music enthusiasts to whom artists’ interests 
are close to heart.  Cf. Peter Navarro, Why Do Corporations Give to Charity?, 61 J. BUS. 65, 67, 89–90 
(1988) (suggesting that corporate executives have mixed motives, including altruistic ones, when 
making corporate donations); see also Bill Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A Moral Basis for Corporate 
Philanthropy, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 745, 747–48 (1993) (arguing, based on empirical research, that the 
“overwhelmingly dominant” explanation for why executives engage in corporate philanthropy was 
“corporate citizenship”). 
 117. See supra Part I.C. 
 118. Services that secure sites and online payment processes are abundant, and some of which are 
even free.  See Brian Krebs, Free Tools to Secure Your Web Site, WASH. POST (June 26, 2008, 1:54 
PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/06/free_tools_to_secure_your_web_1.html. 
 119. There are various ways that services can be asked to prove their reliability.  For example, they 
can publicize each donation in real-time so that users can verify the amount, and the Fair Trade 
Copyright would be able to compare the sum that was published with the sums they have actually 
received.  An honor system might be sufficient in some cases as well and is utilized by other PROs, such 
as ASCAP, when the cost of verifying the playlist is prohibitive. 
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trademark or revoke it if the service does not adhere to the PRO’s guidelines.  
Moreover, this mechanism would enable the PRO to take action under trademark 
law against services that use the mark without authorization. 
Finally, because the PRO would supervise the reliability of the services, the 
mark would be able to fulfill the third function mentioned above:  signaling to users 
which services are reliable for contributions. 
B.  THE BENEFITS OF THE FAIR TRADE COPYRIGHT MODEL 
The Fair Trade Copyright model would create a new source of revenues for 
digital music:  users’ donations.  These new revenues will be directed in full to 
recording artists, and would thus dramatically improve the prospect of revenues 
artists can expect from digital music.  In the long run, the Fair Trade Copyright 
model has potential to function as an equalizing tool within the music industry and 
tilt its internal power balance in favor of artists. 
The Fair Trade Copyright model purports to enlarge the pie of revenues that 
flow into the industry, rather than to merely redistribute income from existing 
sources and affect how the pie is divided.  Specifically, the system would provide 
artists with income from both the illegal market for recorded music—which thus 
far has not been monetized at all—and the legal market, which did generate 
profits—but not so much for artists.120 
Consider, first, the illegal market for recorded music.  Copyright law grants 
copyright owners a limited property right in their works,121 which connotes a right 
to exclude others from using them.122  The exclusionary nature of copyright forces 
a dichotomist choice on users:  whether to pay the full price copyright owners 
demand for their work, or to pay zero and obtain the music illegally.123  Users who 
are able and willing to pay more than zero but less than the demanded price end up 
consuming the works without paying any compensation to copyright owners or 
 
 120. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 121. For a discussion on the property nature of copyright see, for example, Balganesh, supra note 
81; Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1679–80 (2009) (discussing how the property-like characteristics of copyright 
“exist alongside considerable nonproperty features”); Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, 
Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007); Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, 
Copyright as Tort, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004) (noting that consumption of 
information is “nonrivalrous”); Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 56, 80–81 (2006) (“[T]he understanding that copyright is property tends to support a simplistic 
view about the nature of that property.”); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual 
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2667 (1994) (“All familiar with the IPR field recognize the strong 
presumption in favor of injunctions.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 783 (2007) (“‘[T]he right to exclude’ is the essence of a true 
property right.”).  Exceptions to the “right to exclude” of rights holders include, inter alia, area-specific 
compulsory licenses in 17 U.S.C. §§ 114, 115.  See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 
158–60 (2000) (considering fair use as a “zero price” compulsory-licensing scheme).  
 123. Some legal services may offer the music for free as well. 
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creators.  Because copyright involves supracompetitive pricing,124 there certainly 
are users who would be willing to pay more than zero for accessing music online, 
but have no way to do so.125 
What is more, copyright litigation strategy focuses on injunction, rather than 
monetization of copyright infringement.126  Record labels have consistently refused 
to license their content to file sharing services at any price, and have proved 
unwilling to monetize the illegal market.127  The Fair Trade Copyright model 
would enable artists to monetize the illegal market by allowing users to donate a 
sum of their choice to artists, while permitting copyright owners to use their 
copyrights, license them or take legal actions against illegal users or networks. 
Legal services for music also encompass an unrealized market that the Fair 
Trade Copyright can capture.  The need of music services to “compete with free” 
has driven services to offer music for free or at a very low price.128  In the absence 
of perfect price discrimination, however, many users might be willing to pay more 
than the sums they are currently required to pay to access music.129  The Fair Trade 
Copyright model would be able to capture these users and enlarge the revenue pie, 
as well as to allocate these revenues to recording artists. 
In combination, these two new income sources—donations from both legal and 
illegal markets—can lead to a dramatic improvement in the economic outlook of 
 
 124. In a competitive market, the price of a copyrighted work would reflect the marginal cost of 
supplying that copy.  Proprietary copyright results in supracompetitive pricing, because the prices reflect 
the cost of creating the work in the first place.  See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S 
PARADOX 124–28 (2008); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete 
Public Goods, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 26 (2009) (“In today’s copyright-based economy, 
pricing systems attempt to extract from consumers a much higher payment for wildly popular works, 
even where no additional costs are involved.  This represents an attempt to extract the work’s value from 
consumers, and is a pricing approach fundamentally inconsistent with competitive markets.”).  The 
monopoly of record labels in the industry exacerbates the problem.  See Starr v. Sony BMG Music 
Entm’t, No. 08-5637-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 768 (discussing the pricing methods of the major labels 
on online platforms). 
 125. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1727–28 nn.1–2 (2000); S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, 
Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 181, 184 (1986); see also Michael 
Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 
(2005); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-To-Peer File-
sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product 
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004) (arguing for a model of “monopolistic competition” for 
copyrights).  
 126. Copyright law affords rights holders a wide array of remedies, including injunctions, actual 
and statutory damages, disgorgement of an infringer’s profits, and impoundment and destruction of 
infringing articles.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505, 509.  
 127. See Merges, supra note 121, at 2667. 
 128. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Silicon Valley Builds Legal Celestial Jukeboxes, Will Music Fans 
Return to the Market?, OP-EDS (July 26, 2011) http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 11587.htm (“Those 
intrepid entrepreneurs who tried to do things ‘by the book’ found it difficult if not impossible to 
‘compete’ with free (and obtain viable license terms with the many copyright owners).”). 
 129. See, e.g., Douglas C. Sicker, Paul Ohm & Shannon Gunaji, The Analog Hole and the Price of 
Music:  An Empirical Study, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 573, 586 (2007) (finding that even 
among self-avowed “pirates,” 80% would be willing to pay twenty to forty cents per piece). 
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artists.130  The Fair Trade Copyright revenues from both legal and illegal platforms 
would be routed to artists in their entirety.  They would not be subject to the rather 
substantial cut which intermediaries—record labels and digital services—capture 
from other sources of revenues these platforms generate.131  The fact that the PRO 
would be the first stop for revenues would also assure that the proceeds would 
actually make their way to artists.132  The positive economic forecast for artists, in 
turn, would reinvigorate incentives to invest in developing musical talent and 
building careers, as well as alleviate the problems that were discussed in Part I.133 
The Fair Trade Copyright model should have an additional salutary effect.  The 
improved economic state of artists would improve artists’ bargaining position with 
record labels.  As a result, the Fair Trade Copyright model would improve the 
economic state of prospective artists as well, whether they elect to enter a contract 
with a record label or to create music independently. 
Artists who wish to enter a record deal would still have the direct, 
nonintermediated, and unconditioned Fair Trade Copyright revenue stream, which 
would flow from the use of their music on digital media.  As a result, artists’ 
positioning in negotiations with record labels would be enhanced, and may allow 
them to avoid unfavorable contracts.134  The Fair Trade Copyright should also 
improve the situation for artists who elect not to sign a record deal.  The Fair Trade 
Copyright system would redeem the promise hidden in digital media, and turn the 
possibility to create music professionally and independently into a realistic option.  
Under this framework, independent artists would have a clear revenue stream that 
would serve as an incentive to invest more in producing creative works, and less in 
other activities. 
If the model proves successful, the new reality it would create may also “bring 
back” potential artists who were discouraged from working in art because of the 
practical hardships and low benefits it currently provides. 
III.  POSSIBLE CRITICISMS 
In this Part, I raise and address three possible concerns regarding the Fair Trade 
Copyright model.  The first concern is that users may simply not pay.  The second 
is that record labels may hamper Fair Trade Copyright through their contracts with 
artists and through exploitation of their market-dominance.  The third is that the 
model may de facto legitimize and encourage copyright infringement. 
 
 130. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the willingness of users on legal and illegal platforms 
to make donations. 
 131. See supra Part I.B; see also Katie Marsal, iTunes Store a Greater Cash Crop than Apple 
Implies?, APPLE INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2007, 4:00 PM),  http://appleinsider.com/articles/07/04/23/ 
itunes_store_a_greater_cash_crop_than_apple_implies.html. 
 132. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra Part I.C. 
 134. See William Henslee, Marybeth Peters Is Almost Right:  An Alternative to Her Proposals to 
Reform the Compulsory License Scheme for Music, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 107, 118 (2008) (arguing that 
artists have not managed to change their contracts due to lack of bargaining power).  
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A.  LACK OF INCENTIVES FOR USERS TO DONATE 
An obvious challenge for the Fair Trade Copyright model is that users may 
simply refrain from making donations.  Indeed, voluntary payment is fairly 
counterintuitive.135  Why would rational individuals pay to advance the welfare of 
another person at their own expense?136  The challenge remains powerful even 
under the assumption that the Fair Trade Copyright would benefit the donor herself 
as well, by supporting a prosperous creative environment she can enjoy.  A creative 
environment has characteristics of a “public good,” meaning that potential donors 
can enjoy it even without paying.137  Put differently, the Fair Trade Copyright 
provides a fertile ground for collective action and free rider problems:  it is rational 
for every individual to enjoy the benefits that stem from the system (i.e., a creative 
environment) without participating in the system’s costs (i.e., by making 
donations). 
Yet, in many contexts, voluntary payments, however puzzling on a theoretical 
level, are fairly common in reality.  An abundance of evidence points to vast and 
routine engagement of individuals in voluntary payments of various types, even in 
cases where the rational choice theory would predict free-riding.138 
The tension between theory and reality has provoked abundant empirical and 
theoretical scholarship.  The scholarship has identified two complementary sets of 
explanations for the apparently irrational behavior of voluntarism.  These 
explanations shed light on the situations when voluntarism is to be expected.  I 
believe that under both explanations, Fair Trade Copyright fits in with the types of 
 
 135. See, e.g., Ofer H. Azar, The Implications of Tipping for Economics and Management, 30 
INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 1084, 1087 (2003); Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 
1991 (2000); Michael Lynn, Tipping in Restaurants and Around the Globe:  An Interdisciplinary 
Review, in HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 626, 627 (Morris Altman ed., 
2006) (“[M]any economists regard tipping as ‘mysterious’ or ‘seemingly irrational’ behavior”); David 
E. Sisk & Edward C. Gallick, Tips and Commissions:  A Study in Economic Contracting 2 (Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 125, 1985), available at www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/ 
wp125.pdf (“A gift in exchange for service may be a contradiction in terms for economists . . . .”). 
 136. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3–14 (1976); see also 
Steven L. Green, Rational Choice Theory:  An Overview 4–5 (May 2002) (unpublished paper) (“[T]he 
rational choice approach to this problem is based on the fundamental premise that the choices made by 
[actors] are the choices that best help them achieve their objectives, given all relevant factors that are 
beyond their control.”).  
 137. RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 79–80 (1996) (noting that a public good is nonrivalous and nonexcludable).  See generally 
Landes & Posner, supra note 84, at 344–61 (discussing the nonrivalrous and nonexcludable nature of 
intellectual property). 
 138. Lynn, supra note 135, at 626 (“In the U.S., consumers also tip barbers, bartenders, 
beauticians, bellhops, casino croupiers, chambermaids, concierges, delivery persons, doormen, golf 
caddies, limousine drivers, maitre-d’s, masseuses, parking attendants, pool attendants, porters, restaurant 
musicians, washroom attendants, shoeshine boys, taxicab drivers, and tour guides among others . . . .”); 
see also Martin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, 47 GAMES & 
ECON. BEHAV. 268, 269 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright:  Digital Technology, 
Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 863 (2001) 
(concluding that contributions “can reach the level necessary to ensure efficient production of a public 
good”). 
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situations where individuals are likely to make voluntary payments. 
The first explanation concerns social norms.139  It provides that norms—such as 
fairness, honesty and reciprocity—weaken the incentive of potential payers to free 
ride and induce voluntarism.140  Some scholars, such as Robert Cooter, argue that 
individuals often internalize these norms, so that they themselves believe that 
avoiding payments in certain circumstances would be wrong.141 
The social norms explanation renders the success of the Fair Trade Copyright 
model quite feasible.  Indeed, the wide practice of donating to musicians who pass 
the hat after a show would not automatically shift to the online realm.  In the 
physical world, both the internal and peer pressure to comply with social norms are 
enhanced, while Internet use is private and anonymous by default.  Yet, this 
difference is mitigated as the Internet becomes a central platform to manage 
increasing parts of one’s social life.  Moreover, despite the anonymous nature of 
the Internet, users vastly contribute online for various purposes, ranging from 
Wikis142 to fundraising services143 to donation campaigns.144  Several Internet 
platforms, including in the music realm, have successfully based their entire 
business models on voluntary tendencies of Internet users.145  If indeed an audience 
is necessary for donation, the Fair Trade Copyright system can use tools to 
minimize anonymity, such as links to social networking profiles and other visible-
to-all web applications.146 
Online voluntarism thrives thanks to a number of factors that would increase the 
 
 139. Social norms are defined as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what 
ought to be done and what ought not to be done.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996); see also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Science:  Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1127 
(2000).   
 140. See, e.g., Leo P. Crespi, The Implications of Tipping in America, 11 PUB. OPINION Q. 424, 
429 (1947); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (1989) (discussing the 
rationality of tipping); Yoram Margalioth, The Case Against Tipping, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 117 
(2006); Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference 
to Sanctions, 19 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 369 (1999) (describing incentives in tipping). 
 141. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:  The Structural Approach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); see also GARY BECKER, 
ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 139, at 1128. 
 142. Jacqui Cheng, Wikipedia Passes $6 Million Donation Goal, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 2, 2009), 
http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2009/01/wikipedia-passes-6-million-donation-goal.ars (noting that the 
last fundraising campaign of Wikipedia reached its goal within mere days). 
 143. Kickstarter and Kiva provide a fundraising platform for entrepreneurial projects.  See FAQ, 
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics?ref=nav (last visited Dec. 28, 
2012); About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).  PledgeMusic provides a 
fundraising platform for recording albums.  Who We Are, PLEDGEMUSIC, http://www.pledgemusic.com/ 
site/about/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2012).  
 144. See, e.g., James Morgan, Twitter and Facebook Users Respond to Haiti Crisis, BBC NEWS, 
(Jan. 15, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8460791.stm (“An appeal to help victims of the 
Haiti earthquake is breaking all records, fuelled by the power of social media.”).  
 145. See supra note 143. 
 146. A personal note from the artist thanking her donors might be possible as well.  Kiva applies a 
system where recipients of donations can leave a note to their donors.  See Encouraging Those We 
Sponsor, KIVA FRIENDS, http://www.kivafriends.org/index.php?topic=1796.0 (last modified July 7, 
2008).   
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probability that the Fair Trade Copyright model would prosper as well.  First, 
Internet payment schemes have become common and widespread.147  Hence, 
creating efficient digital payment systems that will be used securely and 
confidently is now attainable and well within reach.148  Second, a generational 
change has occurred.  While in the beginning of the millennium, technically savvy 
users were at most high school or college students, today they have greater 
financial means.  Third, the online milieu has shifted from a passive to an active 
experience.  Users are accustomed to commenting, reacting and contributing to 
online content.149  This shift reduces the tendency of users to adopt the mental state 
of passive observers and encourages active involvement.150 
Indeed, I concede that I cannot estimate at this point in time how powerful 
norms would prove to be and how many donations they would actually motivate.  
Yet, it appears that embracing the Fair Trade Copyright model requires no large 
leap from the existing normative framework.  Real world examples for online 
voluntary payment to artists support this view.  The most celebrated example is the 
distribution scheme applied by the band Radiohead in 2007.  The band distributed 
music for free and asked users to “pay what they can.”151  This scheme generated 
millions over a few days, and exceeded the revenues that previous albums yielded 
for the band.152  Other successful examples exist as well.153 
 
 147. See Leena Rao, The Online Payment Wars Continue:  PayPal Officially Announces Flexible 
API, TECHCRUNCH (July 23, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/07/23/the-online-payment-wars-
continue-paypal-officially-announces-flexible-api/ (quoting PayPal’s President that $2,000 flows 
through PayPal’s system every second).  New online payment services have proliferated recently, 
partially thanks to PayPal, which opened its platform in late 2009, thus sparing services many 
technological and bureaucratic barriers.  See PayPal to Become First Truly Global Payment Platform 
Open to Third-Party Developers, PAYPAL (July 23, 2009), https://www.paypal-media.com/press-
releases?year=2009#20090723006226.  Services that connected to PayPal’s infrastructure include, e.g., 
TwitPay.me and QuickPay. 
 148. See JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, ONLINE RETAIL PAYMENTS FORECAST 2010–2014 
(2010) (noting that 63% of consumers are comfortable or very comfortable with shopping online; only 
22% have not made an online purchase in the past year; and that 50% of online consumers chose 
payment services other than credit or debit cards).  These percentages are expected to grow. 
 149.  For example, content-based sites enable users to link to features outside of the site, share 
content, shop for products on other sites or subscribe to various services.  
 150. See supra note 146. 
 151. See MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET PROJECT DATA MEMO RE:  MUSIC AND 
VIDEO DOWNLOADING MOVES BEYOND P2P 9 (2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/ 
media//Files/Reports/2005/PIP_Filesharing_March05.pdf.pdf; see also Eliot Van Buskirk, Estimates:  
Radiohead Made up to $10 Million on Initial Album Sales, WIRED (Oct. 19, 2007, 9:35 AM), 
http://blog.wired.com/music/2007/10/estimates-radio.html. 
 152. Van Buskirk, supra note 151 (noting that the program resulted in approximately six to ten 
million dollars). 
 153. See, e.g., MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 151, at 13 (describing how Nine Inch Nails’ album 
Ghosts I-IV became the 2008 bestselling MP3 album on Amazon, although the band members 
distributed it for free via P2P networks).  In another instance, the author Cory Doctorow published a 
novel online for free on the same day that it was released in print.  Sales targets were reached months 
before the publisher had expected.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 284 (2004).  
Stephen King’s experiment—to publish chapters of his novel on his website, as long as three quarters of 
users pay one dollar per chapter—maintained above 70% paid downloads.  See Stephen King, How I 
(2) HELMAN_POST-FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2013  12:19 PM 
184 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [36:2 
The second explanation for voluntarism rebuts the assumption that voluntary 
payments comprise an irrational behavior.  According to this view, donors do 
derive benefits—though nonmonetary ones—from making contributions.154  Glynn 
Lunney has gathered five such possible benefits from the sociological and 
economic research.155  The first is altruism, namely “satisfaction from the 
satisfaction others experience from the good’s creation.”156  A second interest 
individuals may derive from using the system is “the warm glow effect,” namely, 
satisfaction derived directly from the act of contribution.157  Third, some 
individuals recognize the long-term interest they themselves can derive from the 
public good.158  Group theory provides a fourth explanation for voluntary 
payments, positing that individuals benefit from belonging to a group, and that 
groups have various informal ways to encourage voluntarism.159  Fifth, some 
individuals seek to enhance their reputation by acting voluntarily.160  Other scholars 
have emphasized individuals’ interest in flattering self-image in addition to 
reputation.161  Additionally, some scholars have contended that voluntary payments 
help create reciprocal relationships with others, the relationships in which most 
individuals feel comfortable.162 
Not only would these interests apply in the Fair Trade Copyright framework, but 
they can also be augmented for a number of reasons.  First, from the point of view 
of music aficionados, their “social distance” from artists is smaller than from the 
waiters and bell-persons they are accustomed to tipping.163  While the latter are 
 
Got That Story, TIME EUR. (Jan. 8, 2000), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 
0,8599,2050164,00.html; see also Mark G. Tratos, The Impact of the Internet & Digital Media on the 
Entertainment Industry, in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 133, 206–07 
(Practicing Law Inst. 2007); M.J. Rose, Stephen King’s ‘Plant’ Uprooted, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2000), 
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2000/11/40356.  The project was abandoned, but not due 
to the declining donations.  See King, supra.  Clearly, King’s model differs from the Fair Trade 
Copyright; it is similar to the traditional quid pro quo of copyright economy, in which users (though as a 
group) pay the author’s determined price for access to the work.  Yet it shows that most users do not fall 
prey to the free riding and collective action problems as economic theories predict. 
 154. Ofer Azar, The Social Norm of Tipping:  Does it Improve Social Welfare?, 85 J. ECON. 141, 
145 (2004) (arguing that when a norm is costly and does not benefit its followers except for avoiding 
social disapproval, the norm erodes over time.); Lunney, supra note 138, at 860–61 (discussing benefits 
individuals may derive from voluntary behavior). 
 155.  Lunney, supra note 138, at 861 (“[Researchers] have identified at least five considerations 
that may lead individuals to contribute voluntarily to a public good . . . .”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  This explanation strikes the chord of social norms discussed above, although groups may 
have informal mechanisms other than social norms to encourage voluntarism. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Ofer H. Azar, What Sustains Social Norms and How They  Evolve?  The Case of Tipping, 54 
J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 49 (2004), (“Another reason for tipping is that people want to feel generous 
and do not want to feel ‘cheap.’  Tipping generously therefore improves the tipper’s self-esteem, 
encouraging him to tip even more than the norm.”).  Azar, supra note 154. 
 162. See Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, supra note 138 (demonstrating through psychological game 
models that concerns for reciprocity induce voluntary payments even in situations where no social or 
other sanctions exist). 
 163. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE:  HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 101 
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short-term functionaries whose individual identities do not comprise a central 
consideration for consumers, many individuals identify with artists and view them 
as role models.  Moreover, the contrast between artists’ importance to users and 
their inferior status in the music industry renders artists a likely object for altruistic 
aspirations.164 
Second, using Fair Trade Copyright can offer users value that other small 
donations often do not:  music is often tied to identity features such as culture, 
ethnicity, age group, geography and political views.  Therefore, the Fair Trade 
Copyright would place users in a position to influence creative outputs and promote 
their culture and personal agenda through supporting certain types of music.  The 
Fair Trade Copyright would also allow users to engage in more reciprocal 
relationships with artists.  As Dianne Zimmerman puts it, “it might be appropriate 
(and in the listeners’ own self-interest) to ‘thank’ their favorite musicians for what 
they produce with some money.” 165 
I do not want to suggest that all users will donate money to artists for each and 
every use.166  Nor is it necessary for the success of this model to argue so.  Fair 
Trade Copyright is not an “honor system” where every unpaid use is a failure.167  
My argument, rather, is that even modest outcomes would comprise a significant 
improvement over the current state of affairs.  Artists’ standard revenues from the 
extant business models would be increased hundredfold by each person who 
contributes merely a few cents at one single time.168  Considering the immense 
consumption of music online and users’ motivations to make contributions, as 
discussed above, the Fair Trade Copyright could easily exceed these sums. 
If indeed this model becomes more widespread, network effects can raise 
awareness of the Fair Trade Copyright model and encourage the participation of 
even more users in the system.169  The Fair Trade Copyright gesture may even 
become a social imperative so that not paying will appear wrong, similar to tipping 
in restaurants.  In this sense, an evolving social norm may become a self-
reinforcing power for the Fair Trade Copyright model. 
While the above framework is relevant to users of all platforms, distinct 
challenges pertain to users of legal and illegal platforms.  Users of legal platforms 
may well feel that they have already paid for the service.170  However, it is 
 
(2010) ( “[S]mall social distance is known as a factor that promotes voluntary behavior . . . .”). 
 164. Cf. Margalioth, supra note 140, at 122 (noting that empathy for poorly paid workers 
motivates voluntary tips); see Michael Lynn & Andrea Grassman, Restaurant Tipping:  An Examination 
of Three “Rational” Explanations, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 169, 180 (1990); see also infra note 171 and 
accompanying text. 
 165. See Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 1123. 
 166. See, e.g., Mimi Turner, Radiohead Plays Price Tag:  Band Won’t Let Fans Pay What They 
Want Again, HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 30, 2008, at 5  (speculating that many downloaded Radiohead’s 
album without paying); see also Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 388–89. 
 167. For an “honor system” model, see Lunney, supra note 138. 
 168. Indeed, digital services may pay artists as low as 0.0005 cents per play. See supra Part I.B. 
 169. Network effects occur when the value of a good or service increases as the number of people 
who use it grows.  See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality:  An Uncommon 
Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1994). 
 170. Payment on legal services can be direct (via online stores or subscription-based streaming 
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becoming a well-known secret that the money collected on legal sites scarcely 
compensates recording artists, as descriptions of the travels of money in the record 
business have spread all over the web.171  Users who consume music legally out of 
considerations of fairness may be even more prone to use the Fair Trade Copyright 
system, for this very reason. 
As an analogy, the system will function on authorized networks in a similar vein 
to the Fair Trade movement.  Apparently, many people presented with the option to 
purchase Fair Trade-certified goods do not excuse themselves from guilt or 
considerations of fairness just because they can legally purchase equivalent 
products that exploit the end-producers of the product.  As a result,  the market-
share of Fair Trade products is steadily growing.172 
A different challenge pertains to users of illegal networks.  Indeed, if infringers 
are nothing but thieves, perhaps they are simply indifferent to the wellbeing of 
others in general and artists in particular.173  In fact, however, while pirates will 
probably not convert to legal frameworks, the participation of many of them in the 
Fair Trade Copyright scheme is actually quite likely.  To understand why, we need 
to first explore why users pirate music in the first place. 
The main and most obvious motivation to pirate music is the gap between the 
cost of music on illegal services (which is zero) and on legal services.  However, 
while the music industry places the full weight of this observation on the “free” 
side of the equation,174 copyright also involves supracompetitive pricing, as 
discussed above.175  In fact, from the point of view of users, legal music is often 
quite costly.  A CD can cost near twenty dollars,176 purchasing soundtracks can 
cost almost as much as purchasing the actual movie,177 and filling an iPod legally 
 
services) or indirect (via ad-based services).  
 171. See, e.g., supra note 69; see also Bruce Houghton, Too Much Joy’s Absurd WMG Royalty 
Statement, HYPEBOT.COM (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2009/12/too-much-joys-
sad-royalty-statement-from-wmg.html; Love, supra note 29; Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music:  
When Artists Are Held Hostage by Labels, GUARDIAN MUSIC BLOG (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2010/apr/15/artists-held-hostage-labels; Thom, FYI:  If You 
Care (Dec. 29, 2007), http://www.radiohead.com/deadairspace/index.php?a=324. 
 172. See Facts and Figures, FAIRTRADE FOUND., http://www.fairtrade.net/ 
facts_and_figures.html?&L=0 (last visited Dec. 28, 2012) (stating that sales of Fair-Trade certified 
products grew 15% between 2008 and 2009, and in 2008 amounted to approximately €3.4 billion 
worldwide). 
 173. See Vice President Joseph Biden, The White House Press Conference on Obama 
Administration’s 2010 Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement (June 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qS-s6dn7tM (“[P]iracy is theft . . . .”); see also For 
Students Doing Reports, RIAA, http://riaa.com/faq.php (“When you go online and download songs 
without permission, you are stealing.  The illegal downloading of music is just as wrong as shoplifting 
from a local convenience store.”) (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
 174. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2010 18 
(2010) (discussing “the lure of free”). 
 175. See supra note 124.   
 176. BRABEC & BRACEC, supra note 35, at 117.  But see Ed Christman, Universal Betting on 
Lower Prices to Boost CD Sales, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSTRE62J04Z20100320 (reporting that Universal has substantially cut CD prices in order to boost 
sales). 
 177. The soundtrack to the film High Fidelity, for instance, was $18.98, while the entire movie was 
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can cost fifty times the price of the iPod itself.178  Not only may the legal price 
simply be beyond the reach of some consumers, but the prices are also often 
perceived as unjust, further discouraging payments.179 
But mass infringement does not result solely from “the lure of free.”180  A 
second well-recognized resistance to payment stems from eroding moral reasons to 
pay for music.  As Paul Goldstein explains, “[p]ublic respect for the rights of 
entertainment companies cannot be separated from the public’s perception of the 
respect these companies pay to the rights of the authors and artists who are the 
source of their products.”181  Indeed, in many cases, infringement has become an 
act of protest against the corporations that seemingly cannibalize almost the 
entirety of artists’ revenues on the one hand,182 and use these resources to sue 
college students,183 single mothers,184 homeless men185 and dead grandmothers on 
the other.186  Rightly or wrongly, pirates are often not perceived as stealing from 
artists but as fighting “evil” corporations.187 
 
available on DVD for $19.99.  See Jane Black, Big Music’s Broken Record, BUS. WK. ONLINE (Feb. 13, 
2003), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2003-02-12/big-musics-broken-record.   
 178. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites and the DMCA:  A 
Safe-Harbor from Copyright Infringement Liability or the Perfect Storm?, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 1, 11 (2007). 
 179. Lateef Mtima, Whom The Gods Would Destroy:  Why Congress Prioritized Copyright 
Protection over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 
627, 628 (2009) (“These end-users believe that the major corporate copyright holders are engaged in a 
system of monopolistic price gouging of the public, and that widespread distribution of the copyrighted 
material that these entities control serves the spirit, if not the letter, of the copyright law.”).  
 180. Supra note 174.  Indeed, file-sharers are not all ‘cheap’; at least one file-sharing site has 
managed to receive sufficient contributions from file-sharers to fight a copyright lawsuit.  See Anthony 
Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward a Model of Effective Copyright Dispute Resolution, 110 W. VA. L. 
REV. 999, 1005 (2008) (noting that the owner of LokiTorrent managed to raise donations from users on 
his website in order to defend a lawsuit against the MPAA). 
 181. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY:  FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 
216 (rev. ed. 2003). 
 182. See, e.g., Matthew Green, Note, Napster Opens Pandora’s Box:  Examining How File-
Sharing Services Threaten the Enforcement of Copyright on the Internet, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 817–24 
(2002); Joel Selvin & Neva Chonin, Artists Blast Record Companies over Lawsuits Against 
Downloaders, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 11, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Artists-blast-record-
companies-over-lawsuits-2590112.php. 
 183. Motion for New Trial, BMG Music Ent. v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. July 9, 
2010) (No. 07-CV-11446-NG). 
 184. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 185. Warner Bros. Rec. v. Berry, No. 07 Civ. 1092(HB)(KNF), 2008 WL 1320969, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2008). 
 186. Nate Mook, RIAA Sues Deceased Grandmother, BETANEWS (Feb. 4, 2005), 
http://www.betanews.com/article/RIAA-Sues-Deceased-Grandmother/1107532260.  The RIAA 
abandoned the mass lawsuits campaign in 2008.  See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to 
Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008 at B1.  But see Roy Beckerman, RIAA Claim Not to 
Have Filed New Cases “For Months” Is False, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS. THE PEOPLE, 
http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2008/12/riaa-claim-not-to-have-filed-new-cases.html 
(Dec. 19, 2008) (claiming that the lawsuit campaign was not in fact halted). 
 187. Ginsburg, supra note 16, 382 (“The overheated rhetoric that currently characterizes much of 
the academic and popular press tends to portray copyright as a battleground between evil industry 
exploiters and free-speaking users.”); see also Enigmax, File-Sharers Safe Until Music Biz Change 
Laws, TORRENT FREAK (Apr. 9, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/file-sharers-safe-until-music-biz-change-
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Without passing judgment on these motivations on the one hand or justifying 
copyright infringement on the other, I argue that Fair Trade Copyright addresses 
precisely these barriers to payment.  First, this model would allow users who are 
willing to pay more than zero but less than the monopoly price of music to simply 
do so.188  Second, the flow of payments directly to artists addresses the insurgent 
nature of infringement.  The rebellious ethos against record labels actually fits well 
with the notion of direct donations to artists.  Third, the Fair Trade Copyright 
system would pull the rug under the most convincing justifications users use to 
avoid payment (i.e., the supracompetitive costs of legal music and the injustices of 
the industry).  Without these justifications, users may find it difficult to ignore the 
pangs of guilt and continue not to pay anything. 
B.  RECORD LABELS POTENTIALLY OBSTRUCTING THE SYSTEM 
The effectiveness of the Fair Trade Copyright may be hindered if record labels 
were to contract around the model so that artists were obligated to share with them 
in full or in part the donations they receive.189  I concede that nothing in my 
proposal prevents contracts from obliging artists to transfer donations to their 
labels.190  This, however, does not undermine my proposal in the least. 
To begin with, current “360 degree contracts” probably do not cover the type of 
revenues the Fair Trade Copyright offers.191  Moreover, some artists have entered 
other types of record deals or do not sign record deals at all.192  In these cases, 
artists would be able to keep the entirety of the payments they receive. 
Furthermore, the Fair Trade Copyright system will be helpful even if artists 
would be obligated to share the revenues with their record labels.  First, the system 
would still create a new, additional revenue stream to distribute among industry 
players, and would improve the situation of artists even if not all of the donations 
end up in their pockets.  Second, artists would become the first stop for revenues, 
and would be able to keep their share in full, unlike today, where their share of the 
revenue pie is subject to deductions and manipulations.193  Relatedly, as direct 
receivers of the revenues, artists should end up in a stronger bargaining position.  
The contractual obligation to pay the labels would be balanced in terms of the 
 
law-100409/ (describing the “David and Goliath-style copyright battles between large corporations and 
various file-sharing sites, services and individuals”). 
 188. See supra notes 123–25. 
 189. Indeed, not only are record labels likely to be interested in the additional revenue stream, but 
they may also stand to lose from a successful Fair Trade Copyright model.  First, artists may demand 
more competitive recording contracts.  Second, artists may be less inclined to sign a recording contract 
as the option of independent creativity materializes. 
 190. I suspect that enhanced competitive pressures on record labels would reduce the likelihood 
that labels would obstruct the system.  In face of the emerging alternatives to record labels, the labels 
must maintain some balance in order to attract artists to sign contracts with them.  However, the 
discussion in this Section would assume that record labels have elected to pursue this path. 
 191. See Leeds, supra note 41 (“[T]he label has an option to pay an addition $200,000 in exchange 
for 30 percent of the net income from all touring, merchandise, endorsements and fan-club fees.”). 
 192. Schultz, supra note 70, at 692. 
 193. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
(2) HELMAN_POST-FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2013  12:19 PM 
2013] FAIR TRADE COPYRIGHT 189 
enhanced knowledge and enforcement ability that can offset claimed obligation for 
debt. 
Additionally, the donations will provide artists with a clearer picture of their 
potential market value.  Today, this knowledge often resides exclusively with the 
labels.194  This information may result in better informed decisions on the part of 
the artists, in terms of entering future contracts and negotiating with labels and 
other entities. 
A related concern is that record labels will exploit their market dominance in 
order to put pressure on services to refuse to install the Fair Trade Copyright 
feature.  Such a pressure, if it occurs, would tilt the incentives of services against 
the Fair Trade Copyright system.195 
Yet, all services are not born equal.  First, such a pressure is not expected to 
have any effect on illegal services.  Furthermore, a more effective pressure may be 
inflicted on services that negotiate individually with record labels rather than those 
that acquire a compulsory license from them.196  As a result, most services are 
unlikely to give in to the pressures of record labels.197 
Moreover, even services that are susceptible to pressure would need to consider 
the reaction of users as well as of the growing group of independent artists.  In the 
competitive market for digital music these groups cannot be ignored.198  Clearly, if 
the Fair Trade Copyright indeed becomes widespread and installed by a critical 
mass of services, it would be less likely that services would give in to the pressure 
of record labels (if such pressure indeed occurs).  If this possibility of resistance 
would not suffice to motivate services, as discussed above, a second best solution 
might be to allow services to keep a share of the overall donations to counter the 
disincentive to use the system.199 
In the worst case scenario that services prove uneager to install the Fair Trade 
Copyright option, the Fair Trade Copyright could be voluntarily downloaded by 
users from a designated website.  This option is substantially less desirable than a 
default Fair Trade Copyright model, although this would also be an improvement 
over the current state of affairs. 
C.  UNDERMINING COPYRIGHT LAW 
Legal services monetize not only the risk-averse tendency of users and their fear 
of being caught but also the norms of fairness and honesty among users, which 
drive them to legal instead of illegal networks.200  While copyright law and 
 
 194. See Eliot Van Buskirk, Inside BigChampagne’s Music Panopticon, WIRED (Aug. 5, 2009, 
11:37 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2009/08/inside-bigchampagnes-music-panopticon/ (noting 
that labels receive and analyze quite specific data from media-analyzers, including the popularity of 
artists as measured by legal and illegal consumption of their music). 
 195. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the incentives of services). 
 196. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing voluntary versus compulsory licenses).  
 197. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 198. See supra Part II.B (discussing the competition in the market). 
 199. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 200. See generally Mark F. Schultz, Reconciling Social Norms and Copyright Law:  Strategies for 
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enforcement remain unchanged under the Fair Trade Copyright model and the “fear 
factor” therefore remains the same, the Fair Trade Copyright may shift the 
normative point.  Thus, the model can legitimize file-sharing and have the effect of 
driving users away from copyright-respecting sites to unauthorized sites.  This may 
erode the importance of copyright law in protecting the interests of the creative 
community, and, despite the claim that the Fair Trade Copyright does not harm the 
existing copyright scheme, it could actually adversely affect it. 
Notably, this critique pertains to a limited group of users:  those who are 
concerned about being “morally right” towards artists but are not deterred or 
otherwise concerned about the law.  Users who either obey the law or are 
indifferent to moral considerations are unlikely to shift their consumption habits 
due to the Fair Trade Copyright model; the former would probably remain on legal 
sites while the latter would continue the path they find preferable regardless of the 
alleged shift of the normative point. 
Thus, it is still likely that some users will continue to use legal services even 
following the implementation of the Fair Trade Copyright.  This would resemble 
the current phenomenon that many consumers use legal services, and even buy 
CDs,201 despite the widespread availability of illegal services and the normative 
shift—which has already occurred—towards embracing illegal frameworks.202 
From the point of view of services, legal services may need to make a special 
effort to “compete with free” in a nonprice competition.203  In fact, however, this 
need already exists today.  Legal services already create additional added value in 
terms of ease of use, interactivity or the content they offer in order to compete with 
illegal services and with one another.204 
Practically, the Fair Trade Copyright scheme in its very essence does not 
supersede any existing scheme to protect, use or enforce copyrights.  Transactions 
through the current models can continue without disturbance and copyright can still 
be exploited in licensing markets or otherwise. 
In fact, a deeper look at this critique reveals that what actually threatens to erode 
the importance of copyright is not the Fair Trade Copyright model but rather the 
development of the industry to a point where copyright has a limited effect on 
fostering artists’ welfare and creativity.205  The Fair Trade Copyright system lays 
bare—but does not create—the disturbing structure of copyright today, and will 
allow for the possibility of users to be “fair” towards artists while disobeying the 
 
Persuading People to Pay for Recorded Music, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59, 63–70 (2009) (discussing 
norms of illegal copying of music).  See also supra note 140. 
 201. See RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2008 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS:  
MANUFACTURERS’ UNIT SHIPMENTS AND RETAIL DOLLAR VALUE (2008), available at 
http://76.74.24.142/D5664E44-B9F7-69E0-5ABD-B605F2EB6EF2.pdf.  
 202. See supra notes 181–87 and accompanying text. 
 203. LESSIG, supra note 153, at 302 (citing examples of competition with free). 
 204. See, e.g., Apple, Labels Stir up Deluxe, Digital Cocktail, PC MAG. (Aug. 2, 2009, 5:23 PM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2351088,00.asp (describing Cocktail as a mutual project 
between Apple and record labels which purports to add interactive features to the albums sold on 
iTunes). 
 205. See supra Part I.A. 
(2) HELMAN_POST-FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/22/2013  12:19 PM 
2013] FAIR TRADE COPYRIGHT 191 
copyright law, and others to be perfectly legal yet detrimental to artists’ well-being.  
The Fair Trade Copyright cannot be considered the cause of this divide.  In fact, if 
anything, as analyzed above, it could restore the moral incentive to pay for 
music.206 
IV.  COMPETITORS TO THE FAIR TRADE COPYRIGHT MODEL 
In this Part, I consider three alternative proposals for reform in the music 
industry.  These proposals stand on three distinct points on the continuum between 
strong copyright protection for records to no copyright protection for them.  I term 
the first proposal “Copyright-Based Model.”  This model aims to strengthen 
copyright law and fight piracy, and it relies exclusively on proprietary business-
models.  The second, which I term “Digital Clearinghouse,” gives up on the 
proprietary aspect of copyright in return for enhancing its monetary aspect.  In 
recent years, several law professors nearly simultaneously came up with variants of 
this idea, proposing that copyright owners should allow users to freely download 
music in return for a licensing fee.207  The third model, “Relinquishing Copyright,” 
stands at the other end of the continuum.  This model calls to give up copyrights in 
digital platforms altogether, and limit artists to indirect revenues of recorded music, 
such as performances and merchandise. 
A.  COPYRIGHT-BASED MODEL 
One attempt to address the crisis in the music industry has been to rely on the 
legal protection of copyright and fight the immense copyright infringement, which 
appears to be the core cause for the steep decline in revenues in the industry.208 
The music industry—headed by the RIAA and cooperating ad hoc with parallel 
 
 206. See supra notes 181–87 (discussing incentives not to pay for music). 
 207. See infra Part IV.B; see also LESSIG, supra note 153, at 296–306 (advocating for free access 
in noncommercial contexts and a charge on other file-sharing activities); Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. 
Fared Use:  The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. 
L. REV. 557, 618–19 (1998) (positing that greater access to copyrighted works will result if copyright 
owners and consumers use automated rights-management technologies to create an efficient fared-use 
system); Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms:  Towards a Liability Regime for File-Sharing, 12 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 55–70 (2004) (suggesting licensing through Internet service providers, copyright 
collectives or technology companies); Ku, supra note 1, at 312–15 (calling to impose levies on internet 
services and digital equipment only if analog sales would prove to be insufficient to incentivize 
creation); Mary R. Wagman & Rachel E. Kopp, The Digital Revolution Is Being Downloaded:  Why and 
How the Copyright Act Must Change to Accommodate an Ever-Evolving Music Industry, 13 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 304–05 (2006) (calling to raise the AHRA fees and to broaden the definition of 
“digital audio recording devices” to include computers and digital devices). 
 208. Besides fighting piracy, this view has called to establish alternative consumption routes via 
new business models which respect copyrights, such as online retailers and authorized streaming 
services which were discussed above.  See supra Part I.B. A related measure has been the release of 
DRM devices, designed to control users’ access or use of digital materials, for example, by limiting the 
possibility to print, copy, download, or modify the materials.  See, e.g., Yuko Noguchi, Freedom 
Override by Digital Rights Management Technologies:  Causes in Market Mechanisms and Possible 
Legal Options to Keep a Better Balance, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 5 (2006). 
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industries such as the film and software industries—has fought piracy on various 
fronts including litigation,209 legislation,210 counter-technology211 and education.212  
Napster, the first file-sharing service for music, was challenged until it was forced 
to close down.213  A similar fate awaited successive file-sharing technologies, such 
as Aimster,214 Grokster,215 Streamcast,216 eDonkey217 and KaZaA.218 
The strict stance against copyright infringement is problematic on various levels.  
First, piracy might at least partially be the wrong enemy.219  Various processes 
beyond piracy have contributed to the decline in sales revenues.220  Such processes 
include, for example, the shift to digital files which do not degrade over time; a 
decrease in new albums released;221 an increase in average CD price;222 the 
availability of competing home-entertainment activities beyond music;223 and the 
 
 209. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., RIAA V. THE PEOPLE:  FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (2008), available 
at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf  (enumerating direct infringement suits).  For 
litigation of indirect infringement, see, for example, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 
919 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom., Deep v. 
RIAA, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 210. See Jonathan Cardi, Uber-Middleman:  Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copyright, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 874 (2007); Copyright Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http:// 
www.copyright.gov/legislation/archive (enumerating legislative initiatives in the copyright arena) (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
 211. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The Digital Broadband Migration:  Rewriting the 
Telecommunications Act:  Communications Law Reform:  Communications’ Copyright Policy, 4 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97, 103 (2005). 
 212. INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 174, at 30. 
 213. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004. 
 214. Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643. 
 215. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Michael A. Einhorn, Digitization and Its Discontents:  How Markets Are Transforming 
Copyright, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 231, 231 (2007) (noting that “content industries have settled 
litigation with iMesh, Grokster, Sharman (distributor of KaZaa), and MetaMachine (distributor of 
eDonkey)”); see also Dale Dietrich, eDonkey Settles for $30M and Shuts Down After Adverse Ruling, 
IMEDIA L. BLOG (Sept. 12, 2006, 2:34 PM), http://daledietrich.com/imedia/edonkey-settles-for-30m-and-
shuts-down-after-adverse-ruling/. 
 218. See Universal Music Austl. Pty Ltd. v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. ) (2005) 220 ALR 1, 
97–101 (Austl.),  available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2005/1242.html. 
 219. See, e.g., Lydia P. Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
673, 675 (2003) (arguing that digital technology is not the cause of the industry’s crisis, rather it “has 
laid bare the flaws of the current system that have been created by a process of accretion”). 
 220. See Seung-Hyun Hong, The Effect of Napster on Recorded Music Sales:  Evidence from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey 1 (SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 03-018, 2004), available at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/publicationsprofile/379 (identifying factors that have higher influence on sales 
reduction than file-sharing).  
 221. 38,900 albums were released in 1999, compared to 27,000 (or 31,734 according to the RIAA) 
in 2001, a decrease of 20–25%.  See Black, supra note 177; see also WILLIAM FISHER, PROMISES TO 
KEEP:  TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 210 (2004) (noting that the year 
1999 was an atypically good year for entertainment sales). 
 222. CD prices increased by 7.2% on average, from $13.04 in 1999 to $14.19 in 2001.  FISHER, 
supra note 221, at 210.  
 223. Id.; see also Stephen J. Dubner, What’s the Future of the Music Industry?  A Freakonomics 
Quorum, FREAKONOMICS  (Sept. 20, 2007, 2:07 PM), http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/ 
20/whats-the-future-of-the-music-industry-a-freakonomics-quorum/. 
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rise of online music stores, which turned the demand for albums into a demand for 
one-track songs.224 
What is more, empirical evidence regarding the effect of piracy on sales is 
mixed,225 and while some research supports the attribution of the decline in sales to 
piracy,226 others argue that the effect of file-sharing on sales is positive, 
insignificant or differential.227 
Other objections to the focus on piracy can be summarized as stating that this 
strategy is not justified under a cost-benefit analysis.  On the cost side, prosecuting 
direct infringers has criminalized otherwise law-abiding citizens and has been 
criticized as unfair and disproportionate.228  In another article I argued that 
prosecuting services has also driven technology providers to the unproductive 
course of liability escapism and led to absence of responsible players from the field 
of file-sharing technologies.229 
On the benefit side, there is no sign of improvement in coping with digital 
infringement.230  Despite some tactical victories,231 the power of the masses 
 
 224. See For Students Doing Reports, supra note 173 (noting a reverse correlation between online 
and offline sales.); see also Anita Elberse, Bye Bye Bundles:  The Unbundling of Music in Digital 
Channels (Nov. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/aelberse/ 
papers/Elberse_2010.pdf (arguing that a third of the overall decline in music revenues is attributed to the 
shift to unbundled music sales).  
 225. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, File-Sharing and Copyrights 1 (Harvard Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 09-132, 2009) (“[T]he empirical evidence of the effect of file sharing on sales 
is mixed . . . .”). 
 226. See Stan J. Liebowitz, A Comment on the Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf Paper on File-Sharing 
(Sept. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017418; Norbert J. Michel, The Impact of Digital 
File Sharing on the Music Industry:  An Empirical Analysis, 6 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 
(2006) (“Using household-level data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey we find support for the 
claim that file-sharing has decreased sales.”); Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing:  Creative Destruction or 
Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006). 
 227. BIRGITTE ANDERSEN & MARION FRENZ, THE IMPACT OF MUSIC DOWNLOADS AND P2P FILE-
SHARING ON THE PURCHASE OF MUSIC:  A STUDY FOR INDUSTRY CANADA 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-dppi.nsf/vwapj/IndustryCanadaPaperMay4_2007_en.pdf/$FILE/ 
IndustryCanadaPaperMay4_2007_en.pdf (“P2P file-sharing tends to increase rather than decrease music 
purchasing.”); Blackburn, supra note 91, at 45–46 (finding that three-quarters of music sales increased 
as a result of file-sharing, while the most popular quarter’s sales have declined); Felix Oberholzer-Gee 
& Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales:  An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. 
ECON. 1, 1 (2007) (finding that file-sharing had “an effect on [music] sales that is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero”). 
 228. Geraldine S. Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit Analysis:  The 
Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 787–805 (2005) (“[T]he possibility that 
costs of criminalizing personal-use infringement may outweigh its benefits serves as a signal to 
lawmakers that treating infringement as a crime may not be an effective way to protect the long-term 
interests of copyright holders or the public.”); Kristina Groennings, Note, Costs and Benefits of the 
Recording Industry’s Litigation Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 589–90 (2005) 
(arguing that these suits were unfair, singling out a random assortment of individuals for 
disproportionate sanctions while taking advantage of their financial inferiority); see also ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 209, at 5. 
 229. See Helman, supra note 106. 
 230. Bryan H. Choi, The Grokster Dead-End, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 410 (2006) (“[I]llegal 
file-sharing has . . . continued at ever-increasing rates . . . .”); Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online 
Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 286 (2006) (“[U]nauthorized file-sharing continued unabated, 
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appears to have been decisive and the deterrent factor has not.232  The year 2009 
saw also a consistent growth in infringement via various channels other than peer-
to-peer,233 and overall, it is estimated that twenty-four million fewer people bought 
music in 2009 compared with 2007.234 
Yet, the most important criticism on the robust enforcement strategy for the 
purpose of this article is that the pseudo-crucial issues of piracy and lost sales do 
not appear to serve the interests of artists.  From the standpoint of artists, the focus 
on sales overstates the interests of record labels and ignores other revenue streams 
from music, which have actually incurred a positive effect for artists.235  Similarly, 
the focus on copyright enforcement protects only formal copyright owner-record 
labels, and not necessarily artists themselves. 
In this Article I do not argue against the enforcement of music copyright.  Nor is 
it necessary to take a position on this question for the purpose of this Article.  But 
the campaign to eradicate copyright infringement, coupled with the copyright-based 
business models which were discussed in Part I, appears to be at least insufficient 
in order to address the challenges of the music industry.  Because artists rarely hold 
the copyrights in their works, even a perfect copyright enforcement would not be 
able to assure artists’ wellbeing.  For this reason, an exclusive focus on copyright 
and control is likely to exacerbate the misallocation costs that were discussed 
above, and widen the gap between artists and record labels to the detriment of 
artists.236  As a result, I contend that even if the copyright-strengthening approach 
continues to be pursued, the Fair Trade Copyright model should complement it in 
order to ensure that the economic interests of artists are advanced as well. 
B.  DIGITAL CLEARINGHOUSE 
A model that has been offered by several commentators in different variations is 
to allow online distribution of music to operate freely in return for license fees from 
users.237  The fees will be collected from users in one of two ways.  Most models 
suggest a compulsory license, in which the monies are collected through a tax or 
 
and indeed grew.”). 
 231. See, e.g., supra notes 209–18. 
 232. See Schultz, supra note 70, at 655 (“The problem with a “fear strategy” is that it is very 
difficult to project threats of detection and legal action credible enough to alter behavior.”). 
 233. INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., supra note 174, at 6 (citing as examples 
unlicensed download sites, news groups, specialized search engines, forums, blogs and cyberlockers). 
 234. Jacqui Cheng, P2P Use Down, but 24M Fewer People Bought Music in ‘09 vs ‘07, ARS 
TECHNICA (Feb. 25, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/02/p2p-use-down-but-24m-fewer-
people-bought-music-in-09-vs-07.ars. 
 235. Show tickets, for example, have increased artists’ overall revenues.  See infra notes 272–74 
and accompanying text; see also BRABEC & BRACEC, supra note 35, at 142; Bruce Houghton, As Music 
Industry Struggles, Artist Income Grows, HYPEBOT.COM (Nov. 30, 2009) (posting “the graph the record 
industry doesn’t want you to see”); Do Music Artists Fare Better in a World with Illegal File-sharing?, 
TIMES ONLINE (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.nashvillemusicpros.com/forum/topics/do-artist-
fare-better-in-the. 
 236. See supra Part I.C. 
 237. See supra note 207. 
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levy on devices or digital services.  The alternative is to enable users to acquire a 
voluntary license from copyright owners for a low monthly fee. 
Compulsory license models have been applied in foreign jurisdictions with 
mixed success.238  In the United States, three partially successful systems exist as 
well:  compulsory license for musical works (as distinct from recorded music),239 
the levy system under the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA)240 and the 
compulsory license for sound recordings for noninteractive services under the 
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA).241 
In the literature, commentators suggested to shift to a compulsory license model, 
in order to capture the lost revenues caused by illegal platforms and legalize (de 
jure or de facto) these illegal platforms.  William Fisher has suggested applying a 
levy system on digital devices, in return for the elimination of most of the 
prohibitions on unauthorized use of audio and video recordings.242  Neil Netanel 
has advanced a model that will allow unrestricted noncommercial file-sharing and 
creation of derivative works in return for a levy of approximately four percent of 
sales on related services and products.243  Jessica Litman has advocated a similar 
model with an important distinction, suggesting that the license’s proceeds will be 
distributed directly to artists and not to copyright owners.244  For authors, the model 
will be voluntary, as they will be able to mark their files as unavailable for 
sharing.245  For users, obviously, the model will be compulsory, as they will all be 
subject to the levy on the devices they purchase.  The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) has been urging the music industry for years to offer licenses for 
file-sharing.246  According to this scheme, individuals who pay copyright owners a 
low monthly fee would be entitled to get music from any source they wish during 
that month.247 
Despite being out there for almost a decade, across the diverse range of 
compulsory and voluntary license schemes, none has been adopted by the 
legislature or by the market.  Complexity might have been the main barrier for 
implementation.  Too many participants, interests and agendas need to be settled in 
order to make such systems feasible.248  Even if they eventually reach agreement, 
 
 238. Salil K. Mehra, The Ipod Tax:  Why the Digital Copyright System of American Law 
Professors’ Dreams Failed in Japan, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 421 (2008). 
 239. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012).  
 240. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 1003, 106 Stat. 4237, 4240–
41. 
 241. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 242. FISHER, supra note 221, at 217. 
 243. Id. at 41; Netanel, supra note 125.  Derivative works must identify the underlying work and 
indicate that it has been modified.  A Copyright Office tribunal would determine the NUL rate, though 
interested parties could negotiate a rate prior to the tribunal’s ruling. 
 244. Litman, supra note 39, at 41–49. 
 245. Id. at 44. 
 246. A Better Way Forward:  Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 1, 2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/better-way-forward-voluntary-collective-
licensing-music-file-sharing. 
 247. Id. 
 248. This concern may not apply to the EFF model which does not necessarily involve 
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by the time relevant negotiations would conclude (possibly in a less optimal form 
than the suggestions here), a shift to a different technological platform may render 
these compulsory models irrelevant.249  Compared to the compulsory levy systems, 
the Fair Trade Copyright proposal is practical and relatively simple to implement.  
It can be put into operation with no legislation, negotiations, raising of taxes or 
other complex processes. 
An additional concern regarding these models touches on price setting.  In the 
EFF voluntary license scheme, the license price has to be low enough for users to 
pay despite the wealth of legal and illegal ways to get the music otherwise, but high 
enough to serve as an engine for the entire creative process and to compensate all 
those involved in it.250  A similar issue arises regarding the various levy systems, 
where the balance needs to be struck between affordability of digital devices and 
adequate compensation of copyright owners and artists. 
Worse yet, while at first glance these proposals offer wide access to existing 
works, the “tax” they would employ will necessarily increase the overall cost of 
digital media.  The net effect will therefore be that the price of speech-enabling 
technologies will rise for all, while only a self-selected group (i.e., “heavy” users) 
would enjoy increased access to copyrighted works.251  The difficulty of this 
reform is not merely the unjust cross-subsidies among users, a criticism recognized 
by some of the architects of these models.252  The challenge also lies in the 
unnecessary increase in cost of important services, which will inevitably harm the 
notion of access.253 
The problem of rate setting is intensified considering that beyond music, various 
kinds of works are subject to the same threat of piracy.254  Consider, for example, 
software, books, photographs, images and audiovisual works.  If a levy system is to 
 
negotiations, except for among content owners themselves. 
 249. This was the exact fate of the AHRA.  Among other things, the AHRA instituted a 2% “tax” 
on DAT machines with revenues dispersed to copyright owners and artists.  See Audio Home Recording 
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 1004(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4237, 4241.  By the time the AHRA was 
signed into law in 1992, however, the seven-year-old DAT technology had already given up its place to 
the CD format.. See Lunney, supra note 138, at 828 (“[T]he AHRA was not entirely successful, given 
that, after the inclusion of the required technological controls, digital audiotape never achieved the 
commercial success originally expected.”).  The AHRA, which did not conceive of computer-related 
media and transmissions in such formats as MP3, has little actual effect today.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-873, 
pt. 2, at 2 (1992); see also JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM § 6.03 (2009); Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 229, 231 n.7 (2006).  
Attempts by the music industry to expand the AHRA to the computer realm were rejected in Recording 
Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 250. Ginsburg, supra note 45, at 1643 (“What sum will seem reasonable to the consumer, yet 
generate enough return to make a blanket license fee appeal to an increasingly broad class of copyright 
owners?”). 
 251. Id. at 1644 (“From the user’s point of view, ‘all you can eat’ is not necessarily the best 
formula, at least not for those whose diet of copyrighted works is modest.”). 
 252. Netanel, supra note 125, at 67–74. 
 253. See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest:  Insurgent Social Movements and the First 
Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA L. REV. 119, 140 (noting that lack of Internet access is 
one of the factors that can limit the potential of the Internet for insurgent social movements and ultimate 
democratization). 
 254. Ginsburg, supra note 45, at 1643. 
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be put in place, there is no apparent justification to limit its proceeds to the music 
industry alone.  Indeed, while Litman’s model applies to music exclusively,255 
Fisher’s expands it to the film industry as well,256 and Netanel’s scheme applies 
“only to most, but not all types of copyright-protected content.”257  The rate that 
needs to be applied in order to compensate all these groups of copyright owners 
may well exceed the sum that is justified on the users and technology side of the 
equation.258  Clearly, because of the need to reach consensus among all the relevant 
parties in the various copyright and technology industries as to the devices to levy, 
its cost and distribution among the parties seems practically unfeasible. 
The Fair Trade Copyright system, in comparison, does not involve unnecessary 
costs to users or services for the use of digital devices per se.  This assures that 
applying this model will not come at a cost of limiting the wide—and important—
access to online services.259 
Most importantly, except for Litman’s model, these models fail to address the 
economic state of artists but rather largely accept the industry’s starting point for 
discussion:  the need to recoup the lost revenues in the sales charts in the digital 
age.  Indeed, despite the promise of digital technologies to do otherwise (except for 
Litman’s proposal) these proposals actually leave the problems of the current 
distributive system very much intact.260 
Thus, even if any of the “digital clearinghouse” paths will be pursued, they can 
be effectively complemented by the Fair Trade Copyright model, which can add to 
the equation the element of the incentives of individual artists to create. 
C.  RELINQUISHING COPYRIGHT 
A proposal, standing at the opposite end of the spectrum from the copyright-
based regime, advocates forgoing copyrights for recorded music on digital 
platforms altogether. 
This proposal stems from a combination of descriptive and normative analyses.  
On the descriptive side, proponents have claimed that widespread free copying on 
digital platforms is inevitable, and that copyright law has, as a matter of fact, no 
role in determining the rules of the game of online music.261  On the normative 
 
 255. Litman, supra note 39, at 3. 
 256. FISHER, supra note 221, at 218. 
 257. Netanel, supra note 125, at 41. 
 258. See Ginsburg, supra note 45, at 1643. 
 259. Litman’s model mitigates this critique, as it cuts out record labels from the recipients’ line of 
royalties. 
 260. See also Ginsburg, supra note 45, at 1646 (“The conclusion that a compulsory license regime 
is better for authors than exclusive rights presumes that authors are obliged in practice to give up their 
rights to a publisher; it disregards the potential of digital media to free authors from the corporate 
distributors on whom they depended to bring their work to the public.”). 
 261. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Living Without Copyright in a Digital World, 70 ALB. L. 
REV. 1375, 1376 (2007); Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED, (July 1995) (predicting that content 
on the Internet will one day be free and content producers will be compensated by other means); John 
Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (March 1994) (arguing for the inevitability of widespread 
free copying); Jon Pareles, David Bowie, 21st-Century Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 2, at 
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side, it has been argued that music should be disseminated for free on digital 
platforms.  A classic argument supporting this view is that for the most part, 
copyright plays no role anymore in encouraging or supporting musical creativity.  
Artists earn most of their income elsewhere,262 and digital media obviates the need 
to incentivize dissemination.263 
The question of how to incentivize the creation of records when records are 
distributed for free has been answered in various ways within this doctrine.264  
Raymond Ku has argued that the revenues from analog sales would probably 
suffice for that purpose, and that if not, a “Digital Clearinghouse,” as discussed in 
the previous section, is a second best alternative.265  Others have contended that 
“free content might increase the value of non-free content,”266 and concluded that 
even if records do not directly result in payment, they will be created in order to 
promote the purchasing of related products such as concerts and merchandise.267 
A recent suggestion is to compensate artists exclusively through concerts, so that 
the record business would serve as a mere vehicle to promote concerts.  In other 
words, under this view, the concert business will support not only itself, but also 
the production of studio recordings.268 
To support this view, it has been claimed that live performances are “the last 
economic redoubt for musicians—the only unique, excludable, non-duplicable 
product left in the music business.”269  Moreover, it has been claimed that most 
artists already earn most of their money from concerts,270 and that this market is 
actually “the healthiest part of the music industry.”271  As opposed to the declining 
 
1. 
 262. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.  
 263. Ku, supra note 1, at 306–10.  But see Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital 
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1378 n.127 (2004) 
(rebutting Ku’s argument). 
 264. For a discussion of non-copyright compensation that preceded the Internet revolution, see 
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); JOHN KELSEY & BRUCE SCHNEIER, THE STREET 
PERFORMER PROTOCOL (1998), available at http://www.schneier.com/paper-street-performer.pdf 
(suggesting a “Street Performer Protocol” consisting of a voluntary payment scheme). 
 265. Ku, supra note 1, at 312–15. 
 266. LESSIG, supra note 153, at 284; see also Dyson, supra note 261, at 136 (suggesting that 
content owners would “distribute intellectual property free in order to sell services and relationships”). 
 267. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 106 
(2008) (arguing that earnings from live concerts would probably exceed the sums musicians earn from 
CD sales). 
 268. Id.; see also Chris Anderson, Give Away the Music and Sell the Show, THE LONG TAIL (Jan. 
28, 2007, 8:06 PM), http://www.longtail.com/the_long_tail/2007/01/give_away_the_m.html. 
 269. Schultz, supra note 70, at 686. 
 270. MARIE CONNOLLY & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ROCKONOMICS:  THE ECONOMICS OF POPULAR 
MUSIC 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11282, 2005), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11282.pdf (“The top 10% of artists make money selling records, the rest 
go on tour.”); Peter Kafka, Concert Tours Are Where the Real Money Is, ABC NEWS (July 11, 2003), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=86535&page=1; Eliot Van Buskirk, Rolling Stones Bank 
$150.6 Million, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2007, 2:37 PM) http://www.wired.com/listening_post/2007/ 
01/rolling_stones_/. 
 271. Scott Wapner, Concert Ticket Prices Continue to Rise, NBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2004), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4601934/. 
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sales of records, the average price for show tickets increased by sixteen percent in 
2006,272 and by eight percent in 2007.273  Revenues from touring in Britain have 
also increased substantially between 2004 and 2008.274 
It is, however, doubtful that the business of performances can, economically and 
in principal, carry the entire business of recorded music upon its shoulders.275  The 
structure of the touring business makes it difficult for artists to reach a widely 
dispersed audience such as that available online, where a cumulative effect of users 
is created regardless of physical location.276  What is more, new artists are not 
likely to earn money from touring.277 
The fact that concerts are being paid for also does not subsequently ensure that 
artists will still create new music and record music at all, a fact that hinders the 
societal values of preserving culture and widely disseminating it for wide and 
cross-generational use.  In fact, concerts and rehearsals may compete with the 
creation of new music for the time and investment of the artists.278 
Moreover, notably, artists who do not perform (the later career of the Beatles 
provides a good example), will have to either perform regardless, although this may 
not be the best way to exploit their talents, or else they may need to find an 
additional source of income.279  Clearly, this way does not allow artists to earn 
money from the mere creation of music. 
There are dual obvious, yet important, differences between this model and the 
Fair Trade Copyright model.  First, the Fair Trade Copyright model leaves the 
copyright framework intact and does not supplant it.  Second, the Fair Trade 
Copyright enables artists to earn revenues from record sales and not merely from 
the additional activities in which recording artists may engage.  These factors allow 
the Fair Trade Copyright to be implemented swiftly without radical changes to the 
current structure, while shifting revenues over time to those who deserve them from 
a practical, societal and legal point of view. 
The perceived ineffectiveness of copyright law today has more to do with the 
distorted holdings of copyrights in the music industry and less with the nature of 
copyright itself.  While the Fair Trade Copyright model recognizes the abuses in 
current employment of copyright, the proposals for abandoning copyright 
 
 272. Anderson, supra note 268. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Do Music Artists Fare Better in a World with Illegal File-sharing?, supra note 235. 
 275. I put aside the question of how the shift to a concert-based model can affect the compensation 
for artists who are not performers, such as song-writers and sound engineers, and focus the discussion on 
recording artists exclusively. 
 276. Schultz, supra note 70, at 686. 
 277. Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 
905 (2011) (quoting music business lawyer Donald Passman that “[i]n the beginning . . . you will most 
likely lose money on touring”). 
 278. See Liu Jiarui, The Tough Reality of Copyright Piracy:  A Case Study of the Music Industry in 
China, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 621, 646 (2010) (“[I]t is not inconceivable that ‘day jobs’ in 
alternative markets (e.g., paid appearances, acting in television or film, and touring) would compete with 
music production for artists’ time and energy.”). 
 279. Schultz, supra note 70, at 753–54.  Note that the Beatles were a hardcore performing band 
early in their career, and only later in the career did they stop performing. 
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altogether are in my view too radical, and may end up throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater. 
In other words, besides the fact that it is probably unfeasible to simply relinquish 
copyright law, forgoing copyrights entirely is a step too far.  One of the lessons to 
learn from the copyright struggle with the digital revolution is that it is often 
impossible to predict the future.  Thus, it may be myopic to rely on the fact that 
concerts—or any other anchor—will remain forever lucrative, while recording will 
remain forever unprofitable. 
The Fair Trade Copyright model acknowledges the hardships in enforcing 
copyrights in a digital age, yet allows artists to monetize the various dissemination 
channels that do exist, which in turn would allow enhanced autonomy and promote 
creativity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In order to emerge from the copyright crisis successfully, content industries 
must look beyond the question of recouping the revenues that have been lost since 
the digital revolution.  An effective reform must address a distributive question as 
well:  how revenues should be allocated among the different stakeholders within 
the industry in order to meet the goals of the copyright system. 
The proposal set forth in this Article addresses this key point in the context of 
the music industry.  The Fair Trade Copyright model is a feasible solution that 
would direct the industry to better fulfill the objectives of copyright law:  to 
encourage creativity, by benefiting those who engage in the actual creative process.  
While the discussion is topical for the music industry, which has been at the front 
line of the copyright battle, a wide spectrum of other entertainment and information 
industries already face similar challenges. 
Two characteristics of the music industry render the Fair Trade Copyright model 
especially fitting for this realm. First, performing artists are recognized and often 
adored individuals.  This feature is much more robust in the music industry than in 
other industries, such as software and even movies and books.280  This 
characteristic increases the chances of adoption of this model by music consumers.  
Second, the controlling position of record labels in the music industry, which 
extends even to business models that result from new methods of communication 
that do not require their intervention, urges the need for reform.  At the same time, 
this monopolistic controlling position has a self-perpetuating effect, and limits the 
ability to accomplish a meaningful reform through the ordinary course of copyright 
policy design, requiring a complementary mechanism such as the Fair Trade 
Copyright model.281 
 
 280. Unlike with music, where users develop affections to the artist herself, with regard to movies 
and books, consumers often identify with the movie or book characters, rather than with the author of 
the book or the movie creators or actors.  
 281. Beyond their ties in Congress, record labels have the resources to function as repeat players in 
the litigation arena.  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, When the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 100 (1974) (discussing the potential of repeat players 
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That said, the concept of collecting voluntary payments from end users to spur 
creativity by individual creators might apply in additional frameworks as well.  
Possible candidates could be bloggers, who could use an equivalent model in order 
to collect donations from their readers.  A Fair Trade Copyright equivalent might 
add an economic incentive for current bloggers to invest more time in writing and 
spur the creation of new blogs.  Other candidates might be photographers, 
designers or independent creators of various kinds, who might benefit from 
donations when their creations are offered online legally or illegally.  Clearly, the 
costs of monitoring these materials and applying a collection scheme might prove 
prohibitive for many creators, at least at this stage. 
An important lesson may be learnt from the implementation of the Fair Trade 
Copyright model in the music realm, even for industries that face completely 
different challenges.  For example, if the Fair Trade Copyright model proves 
successful, it can inform copyright industries across the board of the potential of 
micropayments by end users to ultimately accumulate into considerable sums.  On 
the other hand, if the success of the Fair Trade Copyright system proves more 
moderate, this might indicate the need to continue to rely on licensing materials to 
intermediaries in order to result in substantial revenues—even in a digital era.  In 
both scenarios, we would attain valuable information that can serve in setting future 
policies by industry players and policymakers. 
Overall, the implementation of Fair Trade Copyright in the music realm might 
prove to be a breakthrough in the way copyright and digital technology interact.  If 
successful, the Fair Trade Copyright system may ultimately shift the power balance 
in the industry for the benefit of artists.  The outcome of this experiment is likely to 
have an impact far beyond the realm of music alone. 
 
 
in the litigation arena to shape the law in ways that favor their interests). 
